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Bargaining About Future Jeopardy
Daniel C. Richman

49 Vand. L. Rev. 1181 (1996)

The debate about how much protection criminal defendants should
have against successive prosecutions has generally been conducted in the context of how to interpret the Double Jeopardy Clause. The doctrinal focus of
this debate ignores the fact that for the huge majority of defendants-those
who plead guilty instead of standing trial-the Double Jeopardy Clause sinply sets a default rule, establishing a minimum level of protection when defendants choose not to bargain about the possibility of future charges. In this
Article, Professor Richman examines the world that exists in the shadow of
minimalist double jeopardy doctrine, exploring the dynamics of such bargaining and the rules that govern it.
Professor Richman begins by showing why, for most defendants, the
limited scope of fifth amendment protection against successive prosecution
makes little difference. If a guilty plea does not give jeopardy protection
againstall charges that could possibly be brought, such protection will be afforded by a standard agreement covering the "scope of the indictment." And
prosecutors' institutional constraints will generally offer assurances far beyond those terms. For those defendants not satisfied with these protections,
however, minimalist double jeopardy doctrine presents a dilemma, since a
plea agreement that explicitly protects against unbrought charges can be negotiated only at the risk of exposing crimes or culpability of which the governmnent was not aware. Drawing on recent contract literature, Professor
Richman shows how this strategicobstacle will frequently lead to the creation
of 'gaps" in the protection offered by specially negotiatedplea agreements.
The Article then turns to the rules devised by courts to fill these contractualgaps, rules generally based on due process analyses of defendants' expectationsor prosecutors'"good faith" obligations. After critiquingthese rules,
Professor Richmnan inquires into the extent of the government's obligations
when it contracts with defendants and proposes a set of default rules that
better reflect the realities of the bargainingprocess.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Last term, the Supreme Court once again dared to navigate
the complexities of its double jeopardy case law,' and held that,
because civil forfeitures are not "punishment" for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the government may prosecute a defendant
for a criminal offense and forfeit his property for the same offense in a
separate legal proceeding. 2 But how much of an impact do such
doctrinal decisions make in our criminal justice system?
Consider the plight of a savings and loan executive who finds
herself facing a federal indictment in one district, charging her with
several offenses relating to a fraudulent loan scheme. She would like
to dispose of the pending charges but worries that whatever sentencing concessions she gains in exchange for her guilty plea would be
effectively nullified if she were prosecuted for the other loan scams
she engineered, some of which involved real estate in other federal
districts. The pending indictment-and her limited knowledge of the
investigation-give her no reason to think that the government knows
of these other crimes. Yet she cannot be sure of what the future will
hold.3 Should she bring the uncharged crimes to the government's
attention and seek to reach a global settlement, or should she discount the value of the sentencing concessions offered on the pending
indictment? If she fails to volunteer this information, to what extent
would a plea agreement reached with respect to the charged counts
bar the government from prosecuting on the uncharged counts?
This dilemma is not confined to the white-collar context.
Consider the drug defendant charged with a single count of narcotics
distribution who, upon arrest, confesses to having sold cocaine on
thirty other occasions at the same street corner.
In neither case will the Double Jeopardy Clause, as currently
interpreted, be of much help. But for most criminal defendants-that
is, those contemplating guilty pleas instead of trials4 -fifth
1.
In Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981), then-Justice Rehnquist conceded that "the decisional law" in the double jeopardy area "is a veritable Sargasso Sea which
could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."
2.
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1996).
3.
These facts are loosely based on United States v. Cruce, 21 F.3d 70 (5th Cir. 1994).
4.
During the year ending June 30, 1992, of the 50,260 defendants convicted and sentenced in the United States district courts, 44,154 (88%) had entered pleas of guilty and 476
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Amendment doctrine simply sets a default rule, 5 establishing a minimum 6 level of protection where the parties choose not to bargain
about the possibility of future charges.1 The questions this Article
explores are: (1) What are the reasons why such bargaining might
take place? (2) What are the obstacles? (3) What legal rules should
govern this process?
Asking these questions temporarily puts aside the doctrinal
debate over how the Double Jeopardy Clause should be applied to
successive prosecutions-a debate that has focused on the plight of a
defendant reprosecuted after a trial 8-and looks instead at the sys(1%), of nolo contendere. Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pastore, eds., Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics-1993at 522-23 table 5.44 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1994). The proportion of
guilty pleas in state cases may be even greater. In 300 representative counties, 91% of the
felony convictions in 1990 were based on guilty pleas. Id. at 536 table 5.57.
5.
Ayres and Gertner explain:
The legal rules of contracts and corporations can be divided into two distinct classes.
The larger class consists of "default" rules that parties can contract around by prior
agreement, while the smaller, but important, class consists of "immutable" rules that
parties cannot change by contractual agreement. Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them.
Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 87, 87 (1989). See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal
C. Pickner, Game Theory and the Law 147 (Harvard U., 1994) ("[D]efault rules.., come into
play only if the contract is silent with respect to the relevant contingency.") (emphasis omitted).
6.
I say "minimum" here because defendants will rarely go below the constitutional floor
outside the context of cooperation agreements, which raise issues quite different from the
executory plea agreements discussed here. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56
Ohio St. L. J. 69, 91-111 (1995); Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1987) (finding waiver in
cooperation agreement). But see Montoya v. New Mexico, 55 F.3d 1496, 1498-99 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding that defendant waived right to assert double jeopardy regarding future habitual
offender proceedings where the terms of the plea agreement were violated).
7.
The statistics reported above at note 4 as to number of guilty pleas do not reveal
whether the plea resulted from actual negotiations between the prosecution and defense
counsel. A defendant may plead guilty without any agreement simply out of contrition, or, to be
more realistic, on the reasonable expectation that his sentence will be discounted accordingly.
Nonetheless, the defendant willing to plead guilty is, at least theoretically, in a position to
bargain with the prosecutor about charges not included in the indictment.
8.
See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar and Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law
After Rodney King, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1995); Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment:
Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 106-26
(1995) (suggesting that eighth amendment proportionality analysis can supplement the
Supreme Court's restrictive reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the successive
prosecution context); George C. Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double
Jeopardy Game Offense Problem, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1027 (1995) (suggesting that a focus on
blameworthiness can give content to the inquiry into legislative intent required by the Court's
double jeopardy doctrine); George C. Thomas III, The Prohibitionof Successive Prosecutionsfor
the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 323 (1986) (discussing the proper
definition of the "same offense" in the context of successive prosecutions); Peter Westen and
Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 S. Ct. Rev. 81 (examining
the confusion caused by the Court's double jeopardy analysis of successive prosecutions).
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temic consequences of the Supreme Court's restrictive reading of that
provision. Such an approach not only sheds new light on the doctrinal
debate, but also reminds us that constitutional doctrine may not be
the chief determinant of a defendant's rights and expectations.
Although bargaining will occur in the shadow of doctrine, institutional constraints and strategic considerations may play an equal or
greater part in shaping negotiated results.
Part I examines how protection against successive prosecution
is actually provided to defendants who plead guilty. Off-the-rack
formal guarantees,9 provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause and
standardized plea agreements and supplemented by institutional
pressures on prosecutors, can give many defendants confidence that
the concessions 0 bought by their guilty plea will not be nullified by
another prosecution. A significant class of defendants," however,
may not be sufficiently assured by these formal and informal guarantees and will consider contracting for explicit protection against
charges that have not yet been brought.
Part II shows that, for this class, minimalist double jeopardy
doctrine potentially has an "information forcing" effect, demanding
that a defendant with uncharged culpability identify himself as one
deserving of a higher sentence than the government might otherwise
have thought. Recent applications of economic and game theory to
the contracting process have highlighted, however, how strategic
obstacles to bargaining can lead to contractual gaps, even where the
9.
See Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the InteractionsBetween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261,
266 (1985) ("[T]he law supplies standardized and widely suitable risk allocations which enable
parties to take an implied formulation 'off the rack,' thus eliminating certain types of costs and
errors arising from individualized specification of terms.").
10. The sentencing concessions offered by prosecutors generally consist of promises to
recommend reduced sentences or sentencing ranges and/or to make, or not to oppose, particular
factual representations at sentencing. Because sentencing judges are not bound by these
promises, they remain free to dash the expectations of one or both parties. However, they
generally do not. See Richman, 56 Ohio St. L. J. at 91-92 (cited in note 6) (noting the increase in
certainty a defendant with a plea agreement has even though the judge is not bound).
11. Although it is impossible to calculate how many defendants have concerns about
reprosecution that they fear are not addressed by double jeopardy doctrine or informal protections, the number must be considerable. It is hard to imagine that the successive prosecution
claims regularly litigated in every jurisdiction arise out of new charges that defendants failed to
consider when they were first prosecuted. And the class goes beyond these defendants because
double jeopardy claims will probably not even be raised when a defendant is reprosecuted for
conduct that, though it could have been a part of a global plea agreement in the first case, is
completely different from the conduct charged in that case. Neither are double jeopardy claims
likely to be raised in the dual sovereignty context, where reprosecution might have been
prevented through negotiation. The class also includes defendants whose fears of future
prosecution prove groundless, as well as defendants who did endeavor to negotiate agreements
giving formal protection beyond the double jeopardy default.
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default rule penalizes a party for withholding information.12 Part II
draws on this work to help explain why even the defendant
who-aware of his own criminal conduct-fears future charges may
forego the negotiation of a global settlement.
Parts I and II are thus chiefly positivist in exploring the effects
of minimalist double jeopardy doctrine on the plea bargaining process.
They have a normative component as well, however. The claim is not
that the information-forcing effects of minimalist doctrine necessarily
justify the limitation of jeopardy protection as a constitutional matter.
Rather, it is that such effects (though limited by strategic impediments) are socially beneficial, promoting the separation of more culpable defendants from less culpable, or at least leaving at risk those
who have strategically withheld information.
Parts I and II provide the backdrop against which to consider
the expansive default rules that many courts have created to give
additional formal protection to defendants who plead guilty. Part III
looks at these rules, which many courts believe to be a matter of due
process, and asks precisely what about the bargaining process justifies the mitigation of the harsh double jeopardy regime for pleading
defendants. By inquiring into the appropriate extent of the government's obligation to bargain in good faith and critiquing the existing
hodgepodge of rules and justifications, this Part attempts to formulate
a set of defaults that better reflect the realities of the bargaining
process.
Any attempt to invoke default rule analysis in the context of
plea bargaining is open to the challenge that rules developed to address commercial exigencies should not govern relations between the
powerful state and the beleaguered criminal defendant. Indeed, even
in the commercial context, some have criticized default rule theorists
for systematically ignoring "relational" considerations like "the role,
status, and position of the parties."'13 There are at least three responses to this challenge.
First, as even those most solicitous of defendant rights have
noted, general commercial contract principles will invariably provide
a starting point in the interpretation of what seems very much like a
12. Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 94 (cited in note 5); Jason Scott Johnston,
Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L. J. 615
(1990); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L. J. 729, 733 (1992).
13. Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 43,
58 (1993).
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standard executory contract. The question is simply how those principles will be applied. 14 Second, the existence of private information
on both sides of the bargaining table when future charges are at issue
makes this a particularly good place to apply principles that presuppose some degree of choice on a defendant's part.15 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the analytical framework proposed here does
not deny the imbalance of resources. Its premise is rather that a
regime recognizing the role of a defendant's private information is not
necessarily inconsistent with one protecting him against abuses of
16
state power.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF FORMAL AND INSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF
REPOSE
Any analysis of the bargaining dilemmas that defendants face
as a consequence of double jeopardy doctrine must begin by
recognizing that for a great many, such matters are virtually
irrelevant.

14. See, for example, United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 747 (2d Cir. 1995) ('Plea
agreements are construed according to contract law principles."); United States v. SantiagoGonzalez, 66 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that contract law principles often aid in construing
plea agreements); United States v. Ballis, 28 F.3d 1399, 1409 (5th Cir. 1994) ('Plea bargain
agreements are contractual in nature, and are to be construed accordingly."); United States v.
Martin, 25 F.3d 211, 216-17 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that contract law largely governs the judicial
interpretation of plea agreements); United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 613 (6th Cir. 1991)
(concluding that plea agreements ought to be interpreted and enforced pursuant to traditional
contract law principles); Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract,
101 Yale L. J. 1909, 1910-11 (1992) (evaluating plea bargains with classical contract theory). As
Westen and Westin explain:
[I]nsofar as both the criminal justice system and the commercial world share a concern-albeit for different reasons-for the protection of expectations arising out of bargained-for agreements, the mature body of learning already developed for commercial
agreements should help illuminate the formation of a law of plea agreements.
Peter Westen and David Westin, A ConstitutionalLaw of Remedies for Broken PleaBargains,66
Cal. L. Rev. 471, 535 (1978).
15. The informational asymmetries explored here cannot be generalized across all aspects
of plea bargains. When, for instance, a plea agreement fails to restrict sufficiently the rigor or
substance of the government's sentencing presentation, the failure generally cannot be
attributed to the defendant's refusal to disclose private information. See, for example, United
States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 456 (1985) (holding that a defendant vainly challenges the
government's failure at sentencing to explain why it had agreed to recommend a lenient
sentence).
Some Questions from Law and
16. See Richard Craswell, The Relational Move:
Economics, 3 S.Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 91, 93 (1993) (responding to Jay Feinman's "relational"
critique by noting that economic analysis "also requires extensive factual inquiries").
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A. The Searchfor Repose
Every defendant facing criminal charges seeks repose: to end
his exposure to criminal sanctions at the least cost to himself. 17 If the
pending indictment covers the only charges that can be brought
against him, the goal is simply to dispose of them with the lowest
possible sentence. An acquittal at trial would do the trick. When
faced with the likelihood of a higher sentence in the event of conviction at trial,18 however, most defendants are sufficiently risk averse to
prefer a guilty plea in exchange for or in expectation of sentencing
leniency. 19
Where an indictment does not include every charge that could
be brought, a defendant's goal can be more complex. He desires not
only a reduced sentence in the pending case, but also the avoidance of
a second prosecution that could effectively nullify the sentencing
concessions he obtained in the first case. The defendant must discount such concessions by the extent to which the plea will not protect
him against future charges and the likelihood that those charges will
actually be brought.
The possibility that a defendant may face a successive prosecution is partly a function of the doctrinal limitations of the Double
Jeopardy Clause-the only rule of compulsory joinder in the federal
system. 20 Under the Blockburger test,21 which the Supreme Court re17. A defendant may have other goals as well, as demonstrated by those cases where
sentencing concessions are sought for co-defendants. See Bruce A. Green, "Package" Plea
Bargaining and the Prosecutor's Duty of Good Faith, 25 Crim. L. Bull. 507, 548-49 (1989)
(discussing multidefendant "package" plea agreements and objecting to offers of lenity to a
defendant's loved one in order to induce a guilty plea by the defendant); United States v.
Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing the possible impact of bargaining to
aid a spouse); United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing the legality
of plea agreements negotiated to help a third party).
18. In a 1990 sample of 300 representative counties, the mean prison sentence for felony
defendants convicted after trial was 142 months; the median sentence for this group was
seventy-two months. For defendants who pleaded guilty, the mean sentence was sixty-seven
months; the median, forty-eight months. Maguire and Pastore, eds., Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics at 539 table 5.62 (cited in note 4). Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
defendants who plead guilty are also more likely to obtain lighter sentences, particularly where
the plea is the product of negotiations with the prosecution. United States Sentencing
Commission, The FederalSentencing Guildelines: A Report on the Operation of the Guidelines
System and Short-Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of Incarceration, and
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Plea Bargaining77-81 (1991).
19. For a good description of a defendant's bargaining considerations, see Scott and
Stuntz, 101 Yale L. J. at 1936-40 (cited in note 14).
20. While Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8(a) allows liberal joinder of offenses, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not requirejoinder, and will not preclude the bringing of
a charge not brought in a previous proceeding. For recommendations that a rule of compulsory
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cently enshrined as the exclusive analysis for successive prosecutions,22 the Fifth Amendment will not protect a defendant against a

subsequent prosecution as long as "each offense" charged in a trial or
23
plea proceeding "contains an element not contained in the other."
joinder be adopted, see Elizabeth T. Lear, Contemplating the Successive Prosecution
Phenomenon in the Federal Systen, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 625, 651 (1995); Allan D. Vestal
and Douglas J. Gilbert, Preclusionof DuplicativeProsecutions: A Developing Mosaic, 47 Mo. L.
Rev. 1, 43-46 (1982); Model Penal Code § 1.07 (ALI, Proposed Official Draft 1962) (advocating no
"separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same
criminal episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of
the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single court"); Standards
Relating to Joinder and Severance § 1.3 (ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice, Approved Draft 1968) ("A defendant who has been tried for one offense may thereafter
move to dismiss a charge for a related offense [defined as another offense 'within the jurisdiction
of the same coure and 'based on the same conduct' or 'arising from the same criminal episode']
unless a motion for joinder of these offenses was previously denied or the right of joinder was
waived.").
Many states, either by statute or application of a state constitutional provision, do provide
protection against successive prosecution beyond the limits of federal double jeopardy law. See
Ronald J. Allen and John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine and
Rationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 801, 823-24 (1985) (listing state
prohibitions on successive prosecutions); Lear, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. at 665 & n.175 (cited
in this note) ("At least twenty-three states are currently operating under some version of a
transaction-based compulsory joinder regime.") (collecting state citations). I do not consider the
effects of these diverse state provisions separately because (1) the majority of states do not
provide significantly more protection than federal law, and (2) since no state goes so far as to
bar the prosecution of a defendant for offenses that were not part of the same transaction or
episode as the offenses initially charged, the negotiating issues discussed here still arise.
21. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (holding, in context of a
multiple punishment claim, that two offenses are not the "same" for double jeopardy purposes so
long as "each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does nof') (citation omitted). See
also Thomas, 71 Iowa L. Rev. at 333 (cited in note 8) (characterizing test as "the 'required
evidence' or 'same evidence' approach").
22. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 710 (1993). Although the Justices produced five
separate opinions in Dixon, the part of Justice Scalia's opinion that overruled Grady v. Corbin,
495 U.S. 508 (1990), and held Blockburger's analysis to be the exclusive test for successive
prosecution claims had the support of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Thomas. This line-up has, of course, survived recent changes in the Court's composition.
23. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696. The Blockburger test has long been attacked as "inadequate to
prove meaningful protection against multiple prosecutions." Thomas, 71 Iowa L. Rev. at 370
(cited in note 8). See, for example, Kirstin Pace, Note, Fifth Amendment-The Adoption of the
"Same Elements" Test: The Supreme Court's Failure to Adequately Protect Defendants from
Double Jeopardy, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 769, 798 (1994) ('The Blockburger test's focus on
the elements of the offenses charged is inadequate due to the immense number, and overlapping
nature, of offenses with which a defendant can be charged."); Otto Kirchheimer, The Act, The
Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 Yale L. J. 513, 543 (1949) (concluding that the same elements
test "makes the double jeopardy guarantee meaningless"); Martin L. Friedland, Double
Jeopardy 110 (Oxford U., 1969) ("By itself, the Blockburger rule is totally inadequate to prevent
multiple prosecutions."); Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy: Six Commnon Boners Summarized,
15 UCLA L. Rev. 81, 87 (1967) (concluding that it is a "mistake" to use Blockburger in successive
prosecution context); Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New
Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 Yale L. J. 339, 349 (1956) (concluding that
under the Blockburger test, "there is little to prevent prosecutors from planning cases, framing
indictments and selecting evidence in such a manner as to secure innumerable prosecutions of
the same defendant for the same criminal activity").
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Thus, the defendant convicted for unlawfully transporting cocaine
into the United States can be charged thereafter with possessing the
same cocaine on an airplane without proper documentation, because
the first charge required proof that the importation was unapproved
while the second required proof that it was undocumented.24 Even
where the elements of one offense appear to be fully subsumed in the
elements of another-as may occur with "RICO"25 or "CCE"26 counts
that charge other violations as "predicate" crimes-the two offenses
can likely be prosecuted separately, if such was the legislative intent.27 Moreover, a successive prosecution that would otherwise be
24. United States v. Franchi-Forlando,838 F.2d 585, 589-91 (1st Cir. 1988). See also
United States v. Florez-Pereza, 58 F.3d 164, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Blockburger
does not bar prosecution for unlawful entry into the United States following deportation,
notwithstanding defendant's prior conviction, based on same entry, for the misdemeanor of
unlawfully entering the United States at place other than as designated by immigration
officers), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 782, 133 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1996); Knapp v. Leonardo, 46 F.3d 170,
178 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that Blockburger was not violated when defendant acquitted of
intentional murder was subsequently tried for reckless murder), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 2566,
132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995); United States v. Liller, 999 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no
double jeopardy violation where defendant prosecuted first for being a felon in possession of
gun, then for transporting same (stolen) weapon in interstate commerce); Gray v. Lewis, 881
F.2d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding conviction on second-degree rape after acquittal of firstdegree rape not barred because first offense required proof of force and second offense required
proof of victim's age).
Even more egregious scenarios can be imagined. See Lear, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. at
629 (cited in note 20) ("[A] single sale of drugs may constitutionally give rise to a series of
federal prosecutions for offenses ranging from distributing drugs within one hundred feet of a
video arcade facility and using a telephone in connection with a drug transaction, to knowingly
providing drugs to a pregnant woman."); Note, Consecutive Sentences in Single Prosecutions:
Judicial Multiplication of Statutory Penalties, 67 Yale L. J. 916, 928 n.43 (1958) (suggesting
that a single sale of narcotics could be charged as nine separate federal offenses under same elements test); Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89 Yale L.
J. 962, 966-67 & n.27 (1980) (asserting that the same elements test would permit six successive
trials for a single act of forcible rape).
25. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994
ed.).
26. Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994 ed.) (penalizing those
who engage in a "continuing criminal enterprise").
27. This seems to be the rule that emerges from the Supreme Court's cases, at least after
Dixon. See King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 118 (cited in note 8). Prior to Dixon, the Court held that
the marijuana importation charge to which a defendant had pleaded guilty could thereafter be
used as a predicate to a continuing enterprise charge, at least where the enterprise had
continued after the earlier plea. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1985). The
Court noted that Congress "intended to permit prosecution for both the predicate offenses and
the CCE offense." Id. at 786. Now that Dixon has made the Blockburger test the sole double
jeopardy analysis (giving a defendant no greater protection against successive prosecutions than
he has against multiple punishments), we can fairly expect the Court to allow the government
to bring RICO or CCE charges after the separate prosecution of a predicate offense, even where
no continuing conduct can be shown. The Blockburger test, we have been told, is not controlling
where "there is clear indication of a contrary legislative intent." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.
359, 367 (1983) (citing Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340) (emphasis omitted).
The requisite
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barred under Blockburger may still proceed if it is brought by a separate "sovereign."28 The defendant pleading guilty to federal charges
will therefore have no protection against state charges brought by the
local district attorney, based on the same criminal conduct. Nor will a
state defendant have protection against subsequent federal charges,
29
even if they arise out of the same investigation.
congressional "intent!' to allow successive prosecutions for RICO and CCE offenses and their
predicates will doubtless be found. See United States v. Crosby, 20 F.3d 480, 483 (D.C. Cir.
1994) ('The Supreme Coures decision in Garrett conclusively established that Congress intended CCE to be a separate offense from its predicate acts based on the language and history of
the CCE statute.... We find the statutory language and legislative history of RICO dictate a
similar conclusion."); United States v. Bennett, 44 F.3d 1364, 1373 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying
Garrett test to RICO and finding Congress intended to permit separate prosecutions), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 98, 133 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1995); Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection
Against Successive Prosecutions in Complex Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 95, 10809 (1992) (asserting that Congress intended RICO and CCE to supplement substantive
offenses). But see George C. Thomas III, RICO Prosecutionsand the Double Jeopardy/Multiple
Punishment Problem, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1359, 1387-97 (1984) (arguing that Coures application
of Blockburger in Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam), dictates finding a RICO
offense the "same offense" as its predicates).
28. As the Supreme Court explained in its most recent opinion on the subject:
The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common-law conception of crime as an
offense against the sovereignty of the government. When a defendant in a single act
violates the "peace and dignity" of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has
committed two distinct "offences...
Consequently, when the same act transgresses
the laws of two sovereigns, "it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice
punished for the same offense; but only that by one act he has committed two offenses,
for each of which he is justly punishable."
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (citations omitted). Under this doctrine, each state is
a separate sovereign, id. at 89, as is the federal government, Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187, 194 (1959). Indian tribes have sovereign powers separate from the federal government.
See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326-28 (1978) (holding that Indian tribes retain
sovereignty over punishing offenses against tribal law committed by tribal members).
29. Although the dual sovereignty doctrine will not be applied where one "sovereign" is
merely the "tool" of the other, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1959); United States v.
Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990), courts have made clear that two jurisdictions can cooperate against the same defendant without either's hands being tied, so long as each exercises its
own discretionary responsibility. See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that although the federal and state authorities cooperated in the Rodney King
beating case, there was "no evidence that the federal prosecution was a 'sham' or a 'cover' for
the state prosecution"), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 135 L. Ed.
2d 392 (1996); United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 1990) (compiling list of cases
where "Bartkus exception" was unsuccessfully claimed); Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False
Sovereigns: The Rule PermittingSuccessive Prosecutions in the Age of CooperativeFederalism,
20 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 60 (1992) C'[The published reports of state and federal decisions do not
contain one case in which the [Bartkus] exception has been applied to bar a second
prosecution."). See also United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 497
(2d Cir. 1995) (suggesting that "the entire dual sovereignty doctrine is in need of serious
reconsideration"); Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: MultijurisdictionalDrug Law
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1159, 1209 (1995) (arguing that dual sovereignty doctrine should be revised to protect defendants better against dual prosecutions arising
out of federal-state drug task forces).
For a study of the dual sovereignty doctrine's historical roots, see Leonard G. Miller, Double
Jeopardy and the Federal System (U. of Chicago, 1968). For a provocative critique of the
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The Supreme Court's restrictive approach to the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not the only reason why a defendant might discount his prosecutor's plea offer, however. Recall the savings and
loan executive and drug dealer introduced above, each of whom participated in one or more criminal transactions not hinted at in his or
her indictment. Not even the most expansive reading of the Double
Jeopardy Clause would protect such defendants from future prosecution based on their uncharged conduct. 30 But the possibility that such
charges could be brought might significantly reduce the value of
whatever sentencing concessions the government were to offer on the
pending indictments.
Why might the defendant who compounds for only a small
subset of the charges that could potentially be brought against him
feel cheated-or at least deprived of the full value of his initial plea
bargain-if he were later prosecuted for the hitherto uncharged
crimes? Having failed to "pay" for the uncharged offenses, why should
he feel aggrieved for being unable to get something for nothing?
There are a number of answers to these questions. First, one
should not underestimate the value to a defendant of making peace
with the government and being able to plan his life, unthreatened by
the risk of future prosecution. Indeed, this risk may be greater for the
defendant who pleads guilty to only a subset of the crimes with which
he can be charged than it is for the person who has never been
charged at all. Once a prosecuting authority has focused attention on
a defendant, it may come across proof that facilitates bringing another case. The prosecuting authority may acquire a motive to bring
that case if it is somehow disappointed with the results in the first
case. And its chances of prevailing in a subsequent case may even be
increased once the defendant is handicapped with a criminal record. 31

doctrine on originalist grounds, see Paul G. Cassell, The Rodney King Trials and the Double
Jeopardy Clausa Some Observationson OriginalMeaning and the ACLU's Schizophrenic Views
of the Dual SovereignDoctrine, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 693 (1994).
30. See Thomas, 71 Iowa L. Rev. at 330 (cited in note 8) (canvassing definitions of "same
offense" that have been proposed in double jeopardy caselaw and literature).
31. If a defendant takes the stand in his own defense, he can often be impeached with the
introduction of a prior conviction. F.R.E. 609(a). Although the jury will generally be told to
consider his prior offense only on the issue of his credibility, not his guilt, there is good reason to
believe that the jury will disregard this instruction and be more likely to convict him. See
Roselle Wissler and Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors
Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 L. & Hum. Behav. 37, 47 (1985) (concluding
that presenting evidence on prior offenses increases the likelihood of conviction and does not
impact credibility); Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the
Defendant With a CriminalRecord, 4 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Prob. 215 (1968). Should a defendant,
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Another reason a defendant might discount concessions offered
in exchange for a plea that does not address all of his potential liability is that such a partial resolution would deprive him of the advantages he could obtain through a global settlement. A future prosecution would bring new anxieties, and, should he pay for defense counsel, additional expense. Moreover, a defendant might get a lower
cumulative sentence for all his crimes were he to plead to and be
32
sentenced for all of them at once.

B. Formal Guaranteesof Repose
Let us move from defendants' potential concerns to their actual
ones. Given the limited scope of double jeopardy protection, one
might imagine that-to the extent they are competently represented 33-a great many defendants are radically discounting government plea offers; or, to put it another way, that prosecutors must
regularly offer greater sentencing concessions to defendants exposed
to future charges.3 4 Such a conclusion would be simplistic, however,
because the scope of double jeopardy protection is only one determinant of the extent to which defendants are protected against successive prosecutions.
A large class of defendants can obtain complete repose simply
by pleading guilty either to all the charges against them (presumably
fearing the consequences of such impeachment, be deterred from testifying, his ability to
present a defense may be critically impaired. The jury may also hold his failure to testify
against him. See Castillo v. United States, 34 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Whatever the law
says, juries are apt to draw a negative inference from a defendant's failure to testify."). But see
Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-43 (1984) (refusing to let defendant, allegedly deterred
from testifying by trial court's refusal to bar impeachment use of his prior conviction, challenge
that ruling).
32. See Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, Justice,Liability, and Blame: Community
Views and the CriminalLaw 189-97 (Westview Press, 1995) (noting that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines as well as recent empirical data reflect the "multiple offense discount notion").
33. This is an optimistic assumption that I will later relax. See text accompanying notes
164-67.
34. Much of this discussion assumes that the government can make finely calibrated
sentencing concessions. This may not always be true, and to the extent that it is not, the
analysis loses some of its force. Recent studies of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, however,
show that fine prosecutorial calibrations are possible-indeed common-even where a factbased grid is supposed to govern sentencing. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 83 (Oxford
U., 1996) ('[B]ecause the guidelines are harsher than many judges and prosecutors believe
reasonable, prosecutors often, in collusion with defense counsel, judges, or both, engage in
'hidden plea bargaining' so as to manipulate the guidelines in order to offer sentencing
concessions that will induce guilty pleas."); Stephen J. Schulhofer and Ilene H. Nagel,
Negotiated Pleas Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 231, 260-64 (1989) (identifying some of the ways in which prosecutors can
calibrate plea concessions). My experiences as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern
District of New York confirm this point.

1996]

FUTURE JEOPARDY

1193

in exchange for a sentencing discount) or to enough of those charges to
give jeopardy protection against the remainder. Consider a person
who commits a street robbery at knife-point and scuffles with the
arresting officer. This is his first, and last, run-in with the law. He
finds himself charged with four offenses (which we will assume are
the only ones that can be derived from this discrete episode): greater
and lesser charges for the robbery, and greater and lesser for resisting
arrest. If our defendant is confident there are no other criminal acts
in which he can be implicated, and is prepared to plead to the two
lesser charges, the Double Jeopardy Clause will allow him to rest
secure in the knowledge that the local prosecutor's sentencing concessions will not be nullified in a future case. 35 However expansive federal criminal jurisdiction has become 3 6 it has not yet reached this
street crime. The dual sovereignty doctrine will therefore not even
37
pose a theoretical threat to this defendant.
Our hypothetical defendant could obtain roughly the same
degree of confidence in the finality of his plea by entering a plea to
just one offense-the greater robbery charge, for example--"in satisfaction of the indictment." Were the prosecution later to renege and
bring both resisting arrest charges, the defendant would still be able
to seek their dismissal. Since jeopardy would never have attached as
to either of those charges, 3s however, his claim would rest not on the
35. In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167-69 (1977), the Court made clear that a plea to a
lesser included offense gives jeopardy protection against a prosecution for the greater offense.
Similarly, a plea to the greater offense bars a prosecution for the lesser one. See also Payne v.
Virginia, 468 U.S. 1062, 1062 (1984) (per curiam) (noting that prosecution for a lesser offense
following conviction of a greater offense is barred if the court cannot convict of greater without
convicting of lesser).
36. As an ex-prosecutor trained to come up with federal charges for almost every criminal
act imaginable, I had to give some thought to devising this example of a purely state crime. The
expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction has continued unabated since the 1950s, Norman
Abrams and Sara S. Beale, Federal Criminal Law and Its Enforcement 43-47 (West, 2d ed.
1993); Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalizationof Crime, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
213, 242-54 (1984); Guerra, 73 N.C. L. Rev. at 1164-80 (cited in note 29), without serious
constitutional challenge until 1995, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631, 131 L. Ed. 2d
626 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress's commerce clause
authority).
37. I am assuming that our defendant does not fear future prosecution for crimes he
knows he did not commit. A recent survey tells us, however, that 7.1% of the respondents were
"not at all confident" that "a jury would reach a fair verdict if they were accused of a crime they
did not commit." Geoffrey A. Campbell, In the Shoes of the Wrongly Accused, 81 A.B.A. J. 32, 32
(1995). Moreover, 21.8% were "not very confident." Id. If this survey is representative of
criminal defendant attitudes, and if such defendants have as little confidence in prosecutorial
charging decisions as they do in jury verdicts, my assumption is open to question.
38.
See United States v. Garner,32 F.3d 1305, 1311 n.6 (8th Cir. 1994) ('[J]eopardy never
attached to the charges dismissed as part of a plea agreement"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1366,
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Double Jeopardy Clause but on the Due Process Clause, which the
Supreme Court has read to oblige the government to keep the promises it makes to induce a guilty plea.39
The enforcement mechanisms for the two constitutional provisions are somewhat different. Where charges are jeopardy barred,
they must be dismissed. 40 Where a court finds that charges violate a
plea agreement, however, it can either order their dismissal (specific
performance of the agreement) or undo the defendant's original guilty
plea (rescission).41 This remedial uncertainty generally should not
affect a defendant's assessment of the size of the government's initial
sentencing concessions. Either remedy would prevent the prosecution
from retroactively reducing the price at which it had initially purchased the plea, 42 and, in any event, specific performance is the
"preferred remedy" for breaches of plea agreements. 43
The class of defendants who will be formally protected against
successive prosecutions by pleas entered "in satisfaction" of a pending
indictment 44 may be quite large, because prosecutors have considerable incentives to ensure that an indictment captures the complete
range of a defendant's potential criminal liability. Thus, the prosecution is likely to include in an indictment not only all the offenses

131 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1995); United States v. Nyhuis, 8 F.3d 731, 735 n.2 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating
the same principle); United States v. Soto-Alvarez, 958 F.2d 473, 482 n.7 (1st Cir. 1992)
(concluding that jeopardy does not normally attach to dismissed charges).
39. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971).
40. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975).
41.
See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263 (remanding to the state courts to decide between
specific performance and recission); Allen v. Hadden, 57 F.3d 1529, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a court must remand the case for specific performance or recission if the government breached the plea agreement), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 544, 133 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1995);
Margalli-Olverav. I.N.S., 43 F.3d 345, 354-55 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Hayes,
946 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 271 (1st Cir.
1992) ("The choice of remedy rests with the court and not the defendant.") (citation omitted).
But see Westen and Westin, 66 Cal. L. Rev. at 513 (cited in note 14) (arguing that defendant
should be able to elect remedy).
42. This is not to say that bargaining positions will always be the same at renegotiation.
The defendant, given his plea back, may find himself in a better position than he started if the
government's case has deteriorated in the intervening time. Richman, 56 Ohio St. L. J. at 93
n.90 (cited in note 6). On the other hand, the defendant may have already served some of his
sentence. Moreover, as in any renegotiation of a plea, the government may benefit from
knowledge of the defendant's degree of risk aversion.
43. Margalli-Olvera, 43 F.3d at 355. See United States v. Kurkculer, 918 F.2d 295, 300
(1st Cir. 1990) (noting the court's preference for specific performance).
44. When referring to pleas "in satisfaction" of an indictment, I include pleas addressing
charges that, although not in the indictment, were put on the bargaining table by the government. See, for example, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1978) (finding that
during negotiations, prosecutor threatened defendant charged with relatively minor felony with
prosecution under habitual criminal statute carrying life sentence if he did not plead guilty).
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chargeable for a particular episode, but also all charges from other
episodes that conceivably can be joined. The tendency of prosecutors
to pad indictments with as many counts as they can derive from the
available facts-even when sentences will be concurrent-has long
been recognized. 45 By mustering the longest list of charges possible, a
prosecutor can cow a defendant into pleading, or at least allow a defense lawyer to obtain small (even meaningless) bargaining concessions that can grease the way to a plea.46 If the case goes to trial, a
maximal indictment might impress the jury, and help ensure that the
government is allowed the broadest range of proof (with all the possibilities for spillover prejudice that might entail).47 Moreover, as
Justice Scalia noted in United States v. Dixon, the government would
have "little to gain and much to lose" from a strategy of saving related
charges for use in a later indictment because "an acquittal in the first
prosecution might well bar litigation of certain facts essential to the
second one-though a conviction in the first prosecution would not
48
excuse the Government from proving the facts the second time."
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the simple press of
business will deter prosecutors from intentionally keeping potential

45. See Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in PleaBargaining,36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 50,
85-105 (1968). See also United States v. Zabawa, 39 F.3d 279, 283-84 (10th Cir. 1994) (reversing
district court's order limiting the government to twenty counts of a seventy-count fraud
indictment).
46. See Alschuler, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 95 (cited in note 45) ("[P]rosecutors may simply
wish to give defense attorneys a 'selling point' in their efforts to induce defendants to plead

guilty.").
47. See Sarah Tanford, Decision-Making Processes in Joined Criminal Trials, 12 Crim.
Justice & Beh. 367, 384 (1985) (containing empirical study demonstrating that "joining charges
within a realistic trial setting increases the likelihood that a defendant will be convicted on a
particular charge, regardless of the similarity of the charges or the evidence"); Sarah Tanford,

Steven Penrod, and Rebecca Collins, DecisionMaking in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence
of Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity,and Limiting Instructions, 9 L. & Human Beh. 319,
335 (1985) (concluding, based on experiments in which subjects watched videotaped trials, that
convictions were more frequent when charges were joined, particularly when joined charges
were similar). See also Kenneth S. Bordens and Irwin A. Horowitz, Joinder of Criminal

Offenses: A Review of the Legal and Psychological Literature, 9 L. & Human Beh. 339, 349
(1985) (reviewing empirical psychological literature on the prejudicial effect of joining criminal
offenses).
48. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 710 n.15. A defendant may invoke principles of collateral estoppel

to bar the government from relitigating factual issues that it lost in a prior trial. Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970); King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 131-32 (cited in note 8); Note,

The Due Process Roots of Criminal CollateralEstoppel, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1729 (1996). Courts
have generally refused, however, to apply collateral estoppel against defendants. United States
v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 890-97 (3d Cir. 1994). But see id. at 890 (collecting cases in which

defendants were estopped).
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criminal charges off the bargaining table. 49 This is particularly true
in the federal system for charges related to the conduct set out in the
indictment. The facts underlying those charges are likely to be fac' 0
tored into the defendant's initial sentence as "relevant conduct,
which under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines generally cannot
51
constitute a basis for additional prison time in a second prosecution.
Thus, even were the government's resource allocation decisions based
solely on the maximization of total sentences without regard to the
distribution of sentences among defendants, 52 the federal sentencing
scheme would still limit the incentives of prosecutors to keep charges

49. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 710 n.15 ("Surely... the Government must be deterred from
abusive, repeated prosecutions of a single offender for similar offenses by the sheer press of
other demands upon prosecutorial and judicial resources."); Lear, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. at
648 (cited in note 20) ("Every duplicative prosecution means that [Assistant United States
Attorneys] must ignore, abandon, or downgrade another case.").
See Elizabeth T.
50. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3 (1995) (U.S.S.G.").
Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1179, 1179 (1993) (disputing the
constitutionality of including unconvicted criminal conduct as an aggravating factor in
sentencing); William W. Wilkins, Jr. and John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct. The Cornerstone of
the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 495 (1990); David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic and
Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 402,
403 (1993) (criticizing the use of related-offense sentencing by the Sentencing Guidelines).
51. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). See Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2208-09, 132 L. Ed.
2d 351 (1995) ("Because the concept of relevant conduct under the Guidelines is reciprocal,
§ 5G1.3 operates to mitigate the possibility that the fortuity of separate prosecutions will grossly
increase a defendant's sentence."); Lear, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. at 642 (cited in note 20)
("Even if the government considers the ultimate sentence inadequate [in an initial prosecution],
in many cases the Guidelines will deter a second prosecution because the subsequent sentence
is likely to be concurrent.").
This is not to say that § 5G1.3 will always prevent the same conduct from being deemed
"relevent" to the calculation of a defendant's sentence in two different cases under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. See, for example, United States v. McCormick, 58 F.3d 874, 879 (2d Cir.
1995) (per curiam) (upholding consecutive sentence for defendant based, in part, on conduct
deemed relevant in calculation of sentence in prior case). Moreover, a subsequent prosecution
that includes counts with statutory mandatory minimum sentences will, if not barred by
Blockburger, lead to additional prison time (usually a lot more time), since statutory provisions
are not a matter of Federal Sentencing Guidelines calculation. Thus, in United States v.
Robinson, 42 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 1994), a defendant previously convicted of state narcotics
charges received a concurrent sentence for a federal conviction based on the same conduct, but a
consecutive five year sentence on the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994 ed.) count. Id. at 433 & n.2.
52. This is a questionable assumption. A prosecutor may indeed "attempt[] to obtain the
maximum deterrence from his available resources ... by bringing new prosecutions until the
marginal deterrence available from investing extra resources in a given prosecution is the same
as the return available from investing in some other prosecution." Frank H. Easterbrook,
Criminal Procedureas a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 295-96 (1983). See William M.
Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & Econ. 61, 63 (1971) (concluding that a
prosecutor seeks "to maximize the expected number of convictions weighted by their respective
[sentences] subject to a constraint on the resources or budget available to his office"). But the
marginal gains in general deterrence from prosecuting someone who has already pleaded guilty
and been sentenced on serious criminal charges may be quite limited.
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off the table53 and would increase the formal protection offered by a
plea in satisfaction of an indictment.
C. Informal Guarantees
The class of defendants able to contemplate a plea offer without fear of reprosecution goes far beyond those whose potential criminal liability will be fully addressed by the Double Jeopardy Clause or
the explicit contractual protection of a plea in satisfaction of the indictment. Many defendants lacking such formal coverage may rely
upon the informal protections arising from the prosecutor's repeat54
player status and reputational concerns.
The individual defendant cannot create value for his plea bargaining concessions through other than formal means. If the law
permitted him to withdraw his plea freely, or to retain his legal
claims, his plea would be of little value unless he explicitly renounced
those rights. Anything short of an enforceable renunciation of these
rights would give no comfort to prosecutors (and would therefore
minimize sentencing discounts) because most defendants are one-shot
players-who neither internalize the costs of litigation s5 nor have any
interest in bargaining reputation. Defendants' interests as a class are
thus well served by broad default rules of claim forfeiture56 that
53.

In Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2206-08, 132 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1995), the Court

made clear that while the Federal Sentencing Guidelines can limit the government's ability to
increase a defendant's sentence with a second prosecution, neither the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines nor the double jeopardy doctrine bar the government from bringing this second case.
However, the degree to which a sentencing judge can use her discretion to reduce the sentence
of a defendant prosecuted twice for essentially the same conduct was recently highlighted in
Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 135 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1996) (finding no abuse of discretion
when sentencing judge departed down based on finding that a "federal conviction following a
state acquittal based on the same underlying conduct.., significantly burden[ed] the
defendants") (quoting United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 790 (C.D. Cal. 1993)).
54. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L.
Rev. 373, 394 (1990) ("[C]ontracts that formally provide for legal sanctions depend upon nonlegal sanctions for their effectiveness whenever the legal sanctions are ineffective in inducing the
promiser to perform.").
55. See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to
Render Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 Ind. L. J. 363, 379 n.102 (1993) (noting that 85% of
criminal defendants in the District of Columbia financially qualify for court-appointed counsel);
Robert L. Spangenberg and Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States,
58 L. & Contemp. Probs. 31, 31 (1995) ("It is not uncommon for indigent defense programs to
represent up to 90 percent of all criminal defendants in a given felony jurisdiction.").
56. See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleasof Guilty and Loss of ConstitutionalRights,
the Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1265 (1978); Peter Westen, Away From
Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeitureof ConstitutionalRights in Criminal Procedure,75 Mich.
L. Rev. 1214 (1977) (examining the concepts of forfeiture and waiver); Peter Westen, Forfeiture
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maximize a guilty plea's value to the government and avoid the
transaction costs of explicit bargaining over such claims. 57
In contrast, the resource allocation and reputational concerns
that come with the government's repeat-player status confer value on
its concessions over and above that created by operation of law. The
same resource allocation concerns that push the government toward
including all conceivable charges in an indictment 58 also militate
against bringing omitted charges against a defendant who has already pled. And the government's reputational considerations may be
even more significant. If prosecutors in any jurisdiction regularly
brought new cases against defendants who had just pleaded in exchange for sentencing concessions, the government would soon either
get far fewer pleas, or would have to offer far greater sentencing
concessions to compensate defendants for the risk. By developing a
reputation for not pursuing successive prosecutions-and for restraining other jurisdictions from bringing such cases-a prosecuting
authority can help maximize the value that defense lawyers, who are
also repeat players,59 will place on its plea commitments. 60
Although loath, at least in the federal system, 61 to adopt default rules of protection going beyond the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
By Guilty Plea-A Reply, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1308 (1978). Default claim forfeiture rules will not
apply where a defendant explicitly reserves the right to raise a claim after sentence. Such
"conditional pleas" are authorized by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(1). See Note,
ConditionalGuilty Pleas, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 564 (1980).
57. Judge Easterbrook has noted of the various claim forfeiture and plea withdrawal
rules:
These rules have a common rationale. The defendant cannot sell his rights and exercise
them too. The principal sources of the sentencing differential are the defendant's surrender of his opportunity to be acquitted and the defendanes surrender of his right to
impose costs on the prosecutor. Unless the defendant's rights are indeed surrendered,
there is little support for the reduced sentence. A defendant who enters a conditional
guilty plea must accept a smaller reduction to take account of the fact that he gives up
less. A defendant who enters an unconditional plea and then raises some objection to
the proceedings is attempting to get something for nothing.
Easterbrook, 12 J. Legal Stud. at 319 (cited in note 52). See Kenneth W. Simons, Rescinding a
Waiver of a ConstitutionalRight, 68 Geo. L. J. 919, 944 (1980).
58. See notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
59. See Richman, 56 Ohio St. L. J. at 109-10 (cited in note 6); William J. Stuntz, Waiving
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 761, 832-33 (1989). Reputational sanctions may
have considerable effectiveness, even where many lawyers (and clients) are uninformed.
Charny, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 417 n.144 (cited in note 54); Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 640-51 (1979) (discussing the behavior of markets with imperfect
information).
60. See Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic
Analysis of Good Faithand the ContractModificationProblem, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 337, 345
& n.17 (1993) (noting how the market "may provide a reputational penalty" for opportunistic
behavior).
61. See note 20.
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government capitalizes on its repeat-player status by issuing nonbinding guidelines promising restraint.62 Regulations, for example,
that discourage federal prosecutors from bringing more than one
prosecution "based on substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s),"
and from bringing any prosecution where the criminal activity has
already been the subject of a successful state prosecution, 63 are far
from ironclad, 64 and, in any event, have been made unenforceable.65
To the extent they are respected, however, they increase the value of
federal plea concessions, and subsidize state concessions as well.
The fragmentation of prosecutorial authority in the United
States obviously limits the reliability of these informal guarantees for
defendants exposed to charges in multiple state and federal jurisdictions. Although all authorities within a state will be treated as a

62. See Charny, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 377-78 (cited in note 54) (noting the role of explicitly
non-binding commitments in other contexts).
I do not mean to suggest that the Petite policy, see note 63, was devised for plea-bargaining
purposes; I simply note its effect in that area. The policy itself may be as much a product of
grace as of self-interest. Long before any formal departmental promulgation, the Supreme
Court confidently observed:
It is almost certain, that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the
State and federal systems are administered, an offender who should have suffered the
penalties denounced by the one would not be subjected a second time to punishment by
the other for acts essentially the same, unless indeed this might occur in instances of
peculiar enormity, or where the public safety demanded extraordinary rigor.
Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 Howard) 410, 435 (1847).
63. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 3(a) United States Attorneys' Manual 9-2.142 (Dec. 14, 1994
revision). The strictures enunciated in these regulations are known as the "Petite policy"-so
named after Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), in which the government filed a motion
to vacate a conviction, noting a "general policy. . . 'that several offenses arising out of the same
transaction should be alleged and tried together and should not be made the basis of multiple
prosecutions, a policy dictated by considerations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient
and orderly law enforcement.'" Id. at 530. Justice Department officials have praised the Petite
policy for ensuring that dual prosecutions occur only in exceptional cases. See Harry Litman
and Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions: A Model for ConcurrentFederal Jurisdiction,543
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 72 (1996).
64. See Joseph S. Allerhand, Note, The Petite Policy: An Example of Enlightened
ProsecutorialDiscretion,66 Geo. L. J. 1137, 1159-61 (1978) (discussing the administration of the
Petite policy and suggesting improvements for greater fairness and efficiency); Anthony
Amsterdam, 1 Trial Manual 5 for the Defense of Criminal Cases § 177 at 302 (ALI, 5th ed. 1988)
(" 'Petite policy' is frequently violated in practice through inadvertence, and defense counsel
may have to remind the federal prosecutor of it in cases in which it applies."); Lear, 85 J. Crim.
L. & Criminol. at 629-31 (cited in note 20) (discussing exceptions to the Petite policy); Guerra, 73
N.C. L. Rev. at 1196 n.178 (cited in note 29) (listing examples of recent cases in which the Petite
policy was violated).
65. See Abrams and Beale, Federal CriminalLaw and Its Enforcement at 771-72 (cited in
note 36) (collecting cases where courts have refused to consider the merits of alleged violations
of the Petite policy).
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single unit under double jeopardy doctrine,66 as will all federal offices,
the semi-autonomous status of each prosecuting office 67 decreases the
extent to which one office will internalize the reputational and
allocational concerns of another office. Nevertheless, the common
interest of prosecuting offices in maximizing the value of their concessions, and the sense that there is enough crime to go around, still give
these guarantees considerable weight for most defendants.
D. The Limits of Formal and Informal Guarantees
Notwithstanding the various formal and informal protections
against reprosecution, a significant class of defendants remains at
risk even after having entered pleas disposing of pending charges.
This is because a prosecutor's allocational and reputational concerns
may be trumped by other factors.
New evidence may come to light suggesting that a defendant
has committed other crimes and/or has far greater culpability with
respect to the crimes charged in the indictment than was previously
thought. 68 Political considerations may lead a prosecutor to bring new
charges against a defendant the prosecutor feels received a
comparatively light sentence the first time around. 69 Important

66.

See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1970) (concluding that a state's political

subdivisions are not separate sovereign entities).
67.

See James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States: U.S. Attorneys in the Political

and Legal Systems 101-25 (John Hopkins U., 1978) (examining "patterns of interaction" between
U.S. Attorneys and the Department of Justice); Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal
Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 246,
249-50 (1980) (noting the independence of U.S. Attorneys' Offices).
68. In addition, the evidence may have been available to prosecutors at the time of the
defendant's initial indictment, but not acted upon. Such was the case in Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508 (1990), where the district attorney's office, although aware that a victim had died,
failed to prevent the defendant from pleading to two misdemeanors arising out the same
conduct. Id. at 511-12. Grady was not the first case where a prosecutorial coordination failure
in the wake of a car crash led to a successive prosecution later challenged in the Supreme Court.
See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419-21 (1980) (remanding case for a determination as to
whether failure to slow and avoid an accident is a lesser included offense of manslaughter);
Illinois v. Zegurt, 452 U.S. 948, 948 (1981) (denying certiorari in case where the state court
found a reckless homicide prosecution to be barred by a prior conviction for crossing over a
highway median); Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 30-33 (1984) (barring manslaughter
prosecution following the defendant's conviction on misdemeanor charges).
69. See, for example, United States v. Prusan,967 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the defendant was reprosecuted in the second district because the
government was dissatisfied with the initial sentence); State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990) (finding that new charges were brought by newly elected prosecutor who thought
prior plea agreement was "too lenient"); United States v. Padilla, 589 F.2d 481, 486 (10th Cir.
1978) (Logan, J., concurring) (suggesting that the federal prosecutor brought the additional
charge because, while in county attorney's office, he had been frustrated with the low sentence
given to the defendant); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 57, 225 S.E.2d 661, 662 (1976)
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charges may have been withheld from the initial indictment to avoid
disclosing the extent of the government's investigation, in order to
permit it to pursue other targets. And these possibilities all assume
that the prosecutor acted in good faith to begin with, which may not
have been the case.
Likewise, all defendants cannot be confident that other prosecuting offices will respect the finality of a deal. Even where offices
coordinate actions, they may feel compelled to bring separate indictments in light of venue concerns 70 or by a jurisidiction's
constraints on the use of evidence' 1 Or they may chose to bring
multiple prosecutions as part of a concerted campaign to harass a
disfavored defendant.7 2 Coordination or reciprocity may also be
(finding that greater charges were brought "apparently following some public criticism" of an
earlier plea bargain). See also Frank W. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Chargea Suspect
With a Crime 188 (Little, Brown, 1969) (discussing second prosecutions resulting from "feeling
of outrage by prosecutors at the disposition of the first case"); Lear, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminol.
at 635 (cited in note 20) ('CThough incentives to reprosecute for political gain arise only
occasionally, the temptation may be substantial. This phenomenon is not restricted to the
multidistrict reprosecution scenario; the desire to appear 'tough on crime' may also invite this
sort of resource allocation in a single office."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice
Discretionas a Regulatory System, 17 J. Legal Stud. 43, 50 (1988) (asserting that the "somewhat
simplified" goal of a chief prosecutor "is to maximize his electoral majority").
That a prosecutor agreed to the initial deal does not mean he believes the resulting sentence
appropriate. He might have been surprised by judicial leniency; he may have felt constrained
by the weakness of his case; or he may have entered the agreement fully aware of the possibility, likelihood, or even certainty that additional charges would be brought.
70. See, for example, United States v. McCormick, 993 F.2d 1012, 1013 (2d Cir. 1992)
(allowing successive prosecutions where defendant engaged in a series of fraudulent
transactions with banks in two federal districts) (discussed in Lear, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminol.
at 635 & n.58 (cited in note 20)).
71. Where a state's exclusionary rule, for example, excludes evidence that a federal court
would not, charges that depend on the excluded evidence might be kept out of an initial state
prosecution and saved for a federal case. Jill E. Fisch, Turf Wars: Federal-State Cooperation
and the Reverse Silver PlatterDoctrine, 23 Crim. L. Bull. 509, 509-19 (1987).
72. See United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 406-07, 409 (6th Cir. 1991) (allowing multiple obscenity prosecutions, with each mailing charged as different offense); Patrick Ingram,
Note, Censorship by Multiple Prosecution: "annihilation,by attrition if not conviction", 77 Iowa
L. Rev. 269, 269-71 (1991) (discussing Justice Department efforts to drive distributors of
sexually oriented materials out of business through the threat of successive prosecutions in
multiple districts); Lear, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. at 639 (cited in note 20) (discussing the
Justice Department's successive prosecution campaign against those who distribute obscene
materials).
Where successive prosecutions, although not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, can be
characterized as an effort to punish a defendant for exercising a legal right or deter him from
doing so, a defendant may be able to invoke the Due Process Clause and obtain additional
formal protection. See, for example, United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 860 (10th Cir.
1992). See also Easley, 942 F.2d at 412. Absent such claims of vindictiveness tied to the
exercise of an identifiable legal right, however, the Due Process Clause has not generally been
read, at least recently, to create a broad prohibition against all successive prosecutions that,
intentionally or otherwise, tend to harass a defendant. But see King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 134
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threatened where offices endeavor to boost their conviction rates, 73
perhaps to justify more funding, or respond to law enforcement
agencies trying to do the same. 74 And, of course, a prosecutor may
simply feel that another jurisdiction has not punished a defendant
75
enough.

III. CONTRACT THEORY AND BARGAINING FOR ADDITIONAL
PROTECTION

The defendant seeking repose who knows that a pending indictment does not include all possible charges76 but who is not satisfied with existing formal and informal protections against reprosecution has another option: He can negotiate a plea agreement-with
more than one prosecuting office, if necessary-that will give immunity well beyond the scope of the indictment. The agreement could
cover all charges related to a transaction; those arising out of the
defendant's role in an enterprise (legal or illegal); those within the
scope of the government's investigation; or those based on the actions
of the defendant occurring within a specified time frame-the possibilities abound. 77
(cited at note 8) (arguing that a "meaningful due process limit would entail a presumption of bad
faith whenever a prosecutor fails to join offenses of sufficient similarity, rebuttable by an 'abuseneutral' reason, or some similar explanation").
73. See Lear, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. at 644 (cited in note 20) (noting that because

defendants facing sentences that are likely to be concurrent may lose little by pleading guilty,
"for districts seeking to improve their conviction statistics or public image, the Guidelines may
actually encourage successive prosecution"). See also Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal
Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 24 Stan. L.
Rev. 1036, 1045 (1972) (finding that "convictions are the central performance standard" in U.S.

Attorneys' Offices).
74. See Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States at 168-69 (cited in note 67) (describing
strategies of U.S. Attorneys to address agency interest in statistics).
75. See Guerra, 73 N.C. L. Rev. at 1207-08 nn. 245-46 (cited in note 29) (citing examples of
successive prosecutions by state and federal authorities); Litman and Greenberg, 543 Annals
Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. at 77 (cited in note 63) (noting that the federal government brings
"fewer than 150 dual prosecutions each year").
Sister Helen Prejean tells how Louisiana authorities, not satisfied with the three
consecutive life terms given to Robert Willie in federal court for his role in a brutal
kidnapping/murder, sought (and eventually procured) his execution on state capital murder
charges. Helen Prejean, Dead Man Walking: An Eyewitness Account of the Death Penalty in the
United States 119, 139-40 (Random House, 1993).
76. The hypertechnical state of current double jeopardy doctrine makes it inevitable that
many defendants, if not adequately represented, will not even realize that they can be reprosecuted. See notes 21-29 and accompanying text. For now, I will focus only on those defendants
who recognize their plight.
77. Although this Article focuses on bargaining concerning future criminal charges, the
same analysis can be applied to bargaining over a defendant's related civil exposure (fines,
forfeiture, etc.). This is particularly true where the relevant government agency needs to have
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But the defendant who seeks greater coverage risks exposing
crimes or culpability of which the government was not aware. The
government may have had strategic reasons for keeping this information out of the indictment, but the defendant probably would not know
this. He will thus risk identifying himself as someone deserving of,
and ready to accept, a higher sentence than he would have received
after a plea to just the indictment.
A. Blockburger as a "PenaltyDefault"
If our defendant's plight sounds familiar, maybe that is because it is not unique to the criminal context. Think back to the rule
8 Where the operative default awards only
in Hadley v. Baxendale:7
foreseeable consequential damages, the miller worried about losing
profits while his crank shaft is being transported can choose to
"inform[ ] the carrier of the potential consequential damages and
contract[ ] for full damage insurance."79 Revealing information about
his special needs to the carrier, however, will undoubtedly increase
the price of shipping. 80 A default rule of limited liability thus acts as
what Ayres and Gertner call a "penalty default,"8 ' inducing the miller,
"as the more informed party[,] to reveal that information to the carrier,"82 and allowing the carrier to increase his rates accordingly83

more information than is disclosed by a defendants plea before the agency can proceed. The
dilemma faced by the narcotics defendant who can, if he wants, make the forfeiture of a secret
bank account part of a global settlement with the government is quite like the dilemma of a
defendant aware of unbrought criminal charges. See Mireya Navarro, When Drug Kingpins
Fall,Illicit Assets Buy a Cushion, N.Y. Times Al (Mar. 19, 1996) ("[D]efendants are often able to
negotiate lighter sentences by offering to lead prosecutors to property hidden around the
world."). See also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149 (concluding that because "inrem civil forfeitures
are neither 'punishmene nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause," the clause
does not bar the government from seeking forfeiture of an individual's property in one
proceeding and criminally prosecuting him in another).
78. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
79. Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 101 (cited in note 5).
80. Id. at 101-02.
81. See id. at 91 C"enalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract
an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the
contract provision they prefer.").
82. Id. at 101.
83. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principleof Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 563,
597 (1992) C'[B]uyers who invest in information are often put to the choice of communicating the
information to the seller, and thereby incurring a loss of all or part of that value, or foregoing
damages that are the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the seller's breach."); Johnston,
100 Yale L. J. at 636 (cited in note 12) ("[l]f a carrier has some market power-that is, some
ability to set his price according to the shipper's value from the contract and willingness to
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Minimalist double jeopardy doctrine creates a similar sort of
information-forcing penalty default for the defendant aware of uncharged criminal liability and dissatisfied with the standard formal
and informal guarantees. 8 4 To obtain maximum formal protection, he
will have to identify himself as a high-value defendant to all potentially concerned prosecutors. And since a prosecutor is essentially a
monopolist with respect to the charges his office could bring, each will
try to extract a sentence from the defendant commensurate with the
seriousness of the uncharged liability. Minimalist doctrine thus promotes a "separating equilibrium," 5 allowing prosecutors to distinguish between two defendants charged with the same crimes but
having very different potential culpability and/or risk aversion.86 The
tendency is thus to maximize the "toll" society can exact for criminal
conduct and minimize the expenditure of prosecutorial resources.
A nice model-defendants seeking full repose must fully discharge their "debts to society." Yet the model is a simplistic one,
An
which ignores the dynamics of the bargaining process.
examination of these dynamics reveals why even the well-represented
defendant fearing reprosecution might not reach, or even seek, the
global settlement that would give him repose.

pay-then... It]he carrier could offer a menu of contracts, which vary by charging a different
price for different levels of carrier liability for consequential damages.").
84. There may be some limits to the usefulness of the Hadley analogy. The revelation of
the miller's private information will, Ayres and Gertner note, create value and allow the parties
to split a "bigger pie." 99 Yale L. J. at 99 (cited in note 5). But see Eisenberg, 80 Cal. L. Rev. at
587-98 (cited in note 83) (minimizing efficiency benefits of the Hadley rule). In the plea
bargaining context, the societal gain is more elusive. Society benefits to the extent that
criminal activity is revealed and punished, and defendants benefit to the extent they can buy
protection against future prosecutions at a discounted rate. But does society benefit when the
defendant gets a lower aggregate sentence than he would otherwise have received? This
depends on the objective likelihood that he would have been prosecuted a second time and one's
view of the marginal benefits to society from foregone years of incarceration. The Hadley
analogy, however, does highlight the bargaining dynamics discussed here.
85. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 94-95 (cited in note 5) ("In 'separating'
equilibria, the different types of contracting parties, by bearing the costs of contracting around
unwanted defaults, separate themselves into distinct contractual relationships."); Baird,
Gertner, and Picker, Game Theory and the Law at 314 (cited in note 5) (defining "separating
equilibrium" as "[a] solution to a game in which players of different types adopt different
strategies and thereby allow an uninformed player to draw inferences about an informed
player's type from that player's actions") (emphasis omitted).
86. For a discussion of how varying attitudes toward risk can affect commercial actors'
readiness to address future contingencies explicitly, see Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial
Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. Legal Stud. 535, 552-62
(1990).
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B. Transaction Costs
The failure of contracting parties to address explicitly a future
contingency in their agreement can be explained by two different, but
not mutually exclusive, stories.87 One explanation frequently offered
for such contractual gaps is transaction costs: The costs of negotiating a comprehensive agreement can outweigh its benefits.88 These
costs may well figure in the failure of plea bargaining parties to reach
a global agreement covering all of a defendant's potential criminal
liability.
The conventional plea agreement looks to the contours of the
indictment-that is, the description and number of the charges
therein. In contrast, an agreement reaching uncharged offenses must
be carefully customized, bringing the usual risk to all parties when
89
express terms are constructed in lieu of "off the rack" provisions.
The involvement of other prosecuting offices will entail even more
procedural complexities. These negotiating expenses might loom
particularly large in the calculus of the government, which will have
resource considerations that defendants generally lack.
C. Strategic BargainingObstacles
Whatever role transaction costs play in the creation of "gaps"
in plea agreements is likely dwarfed, however, by the strategic bargaining obstacles that Professors Ayres, Gertner,90 and Johnston 9'
92
have highlighted in their analyses of the Hadley rule.
Consider the strategy of the defendant whose critical private
information is knowledge of his uncharged criminal conduct. His goal
is to pay the smallest possible price for that conduct. His decision will
thus turn on the sentence he thinks he will face, discounted by the
probability that he will be held to account for the unbrought charges.

87. Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 92-94 (cited in note 5).
88. Goetz and Scott, 73 Cal. L. Rev. at 265 (cited in note 9) (defining transaction costs as
"resource-oriented costs of time, effort, and expertise expended in the negotiation and drafting
of agreements"); Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 92 (cited in note 5) ("Scholars have
primarily attributed incompleteness to the costs of contracting.").
89. Goetz and Scott, 73 Cal. L. Rev. at 266 (cited in note 9). See also Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597, 609 (1990)
(noting "bias against unconventional risk assignments").
90. Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 87 (cited in note 5).
91. Johnston, 100 Yale L. J. at 615 (cited in note 12).
92. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 103 (cited in note 5).
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Disclosure to the prosecution of the uncharged conduct will change
the probability into certainty, and signal the high value he places on
settlement.
The discounted price the government will likely demand for a
defendant's uncharged crimes, however, might make disclosure
worthwhile nonetheless. In part, this discount may reflect the sentencing benefits of "buying in bulk."93 Yet it can also reflect advantages gained where the government does not already know about
criminal conduct. Since the government may not have expended any
investigative or adjudicative resources on unprosecuted crimes, it
might be willing to share some of its "windfall profit" with the defendant in order to encourage such disclosures. 94 After all, in addition to
saving resources, the defendant is allowing the government to avoid
the risk of losing a future trial on the unbrought charges. Moreover,
even were the government loath to cut the defendant any slack on
uncharged crimes, its failure to have investigated such crimes might
lead it to accept an account in which the defendant has mitigated the
95
extent of his own culpability.
Such are the factors that can induce disclosure. The considerations counseling against the negotiation of a global settlement can
be even more powerful, however, particularly where the defendant
thinks the risk of a second prosecution is low. Such a defendant
might also figure that even a successful second prosecution would
leave him with a lower total sentence than he would receive by rolling
the new charges into a global settlement. By then, the government
would already have invested additional investigative resources to
develop the new charges, but, with a new indictment, the defendant
would gain bargaining power from his ability to call on the government's adjudicative resources, exposing the prosecutor to the risk of
acquittal at trial. Furthermore, even if the defendant were convicted
93. See note 32.
94. The government may forego seeking any increase in the sentence of a defendant
whose disclosures are particularly valuable, that is, where the information allows it to "clear" an
unsolved crime, see Miller, Prosecutionat 197-198 (cited in note 69) (noting that police will often
urge a suspect to "clean himself up," informing him that the additional offenses he admits are
"free"); Malcolm Young, An Inside Job: Policingand Police Culture in Britain 359-62 (Oxford
U., 1991) (suggesting that police can enhance detection rates by obtaining confessions to
uncharged crimes "taken into consideration" at sentencing), or to gather evidence against
someone else. This last possibility, involving essentially a one-time exchange of information, is
to be distinguished from "cooperation," which generally entails a longer-term relationship
between the defendant and the government. See Richman, 56 Ohio St. L. J. at 73 (cited in note
6) (contrasting the relational character of a cooperation agreement to the executory nature of an
agreement simply to plead guilty).
95. But see notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing how a prosecutor, aware of
this risk, may be reluctant to promise broad immunity).
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after trial in the second case, any relationship between the charges in
the two cases might still lead to a reduction in the second sentence, as
96
a matter of law or judicial discretion.
Bargaining risks that arise out of the very process through
which a defendant explores the costs of formal disclosure can also
deter entry into global settlements. Once a defendant discloses his
uncharged crimes or the uncharged extent of his culpability in the
charged offense-as he must do for negotiations to advance-he runs
the risk that the government will "misappropriate" his private information to increase his sentence in the pending case, or gather evidence for another prosecution. Rules limiting the government's ability to use statements made during plea negotiations limit the risk
somewhat, but prosecutors are free to develop new sources of evidence
after the defendant points the way.97 Those defendants interested in
a global settlement but not prepared to commit themselves irreversibly to revealing private information may therefore choose not to
pursue the matter.
The government's own strategic considerations can also impede the negotiation of an agreement reaching uncharged crimes.
Professor Johnston captures the carrier's "strategic dilemma" in
Hadley: "[I]f he persuades the shipper that the shipper will be better
off with the high price, high liability [contract], then he may also
persuade the shipper that the shipper in fact is better off not
contracting with him at all, because the breach probability is too high,
no matter what the extent of carrier liability."98 As a monopolist with
respect to the charges it brings, the government need not worry about

96. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. See also Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2044 ('Acknowledging the wisdom,
even the necessity, of sentencing procedures that take into account individual
circumstances .... Congress allows district courts to depart from the applicable Guideline range
if'the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance... not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission....') (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
97. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) and Federal Rule of Evidence 410(4) bar
the admission against the defendant of statements made during plea discussions, but do not bar
derivative use. Moreover, the government can demand waiver of these protections as a
condition of negotiations.
In United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 130 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1995), the Court upheld a
proffer agreement that permitted the government to use the defendant's proffer statements "to
impeach any contradictory testimony he might give at trial if the case proceeded that far." Id.
at 800. An issue remains as to whether the government can demand a waiver that would allow
the free use of proffer statements in its case-in-chief in a trial on charges other than perjury and
false statement. Three of the seven Justices in the Mezzanatto majority noted that such a
waiver "would more severely undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and thereby
inhibit plea bargaining." Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
98. Johnston, 100 Yale L. J. at 633 (cited in note 12).
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the defendant's finding another prosecutor. Should the government
try to push him to a global settlement through fear of future
prosecution, however, he might radically discount the value of the
government's plea offer in the pending case, or even to go to trial.99
For this reason, and out of reputational considerations that go beyond
the specific case,' 0 the government must conceal its knowledge of
uncharged crimes and the likelihood it would ever prosecute them.'0 '
Many defendants who might do better negotiating a global agreement
might therefore overestimate the efficacy of informal protections
against successive prosecution.
Another obstacle to the negotiation of global agreements is the
government's reluctance to sell immunity for charges it has not fully
investigated. No prosecutor wants to be in the position of having
given up the power to charge for crimes committed during a particular
time period, only to discover that the defendant's culpability was far
greater than the prosecutor thought.102 Yet in the absence of a resource-consuming investigation, the prosecution must rely on what
may be a strategically motivated defendant proffer-an effort to ob0 3 In
tain the broadest possible coverage while minimizing culpability.1
clear cases of fraudulent inducement, the government might be able
to undo a plea agreement later, 0 4 but its underestimation of culpability will generally not be so easily remedied.
99. See United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1509 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the state
prosecutor negotiating the plea agreement with the defendant knew that the federal prosecutor
was planning to bring charges based on the same transaction but did not tell the defendant
"because he was afraid that such disclosure would prevent him from obtaining guilty pleas on
the state charges").
100. The government has much to lose if it regularly focuses defense counsers attention on
the possibility that sentencing concessions may be nullified by future prosecutions. See notes
58-60 and accompanying text.
101. There may be other bargaining risks as well. Disclosure of this information might, for
example, compromise an uncompleted investigation or tip off co-conspirators.
102. The aversion to such surprises can have many sources: fear of political embarrassment, interest in specific or general deterrence, concern for bargaining reputation, etc.
For a case where the prosecutor avoided the consequences of having let someone "get away
with murder," see State v. Allen, 79 Or. App. 674, 720 P.2d 761, 764 (1986) (ruling that the
defendant's plea agreement in satisfaction of the indictment did not bar prosecution for a
murder he revealed during post-plea interview given to police).
103. The government's need to obtain a comprehensive understanding of a defendant's
culpability in this context can be compared to cases in which a defendant negotiates to cooperate. There, because the government can withhold its pay-out until after the defendant has been
subjected to more extensive scrutiny, and may even have testified, the risk of disappointment is
far smaller. See Richman, 56 Ohio St. L. J. at 95-105 (cited in note 6) (describing cooperation
agreements). See also United States v. Hawes, 774 F. Supp. 965, 971 & n.2 (E.D.N.C. 1991)
(noting that agreements not to prosecute the defendant for "any transactions involved in this
investigation" are generally reserved for testifying cooperators).
104. See Mayes v. Galley, 858 F. Supp. 490, 495-96 n.11 (D. Md. 1994) (collecting cases).
See also State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108, 645 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1982) (finding that the
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There are thus two sorts of strategic obstacles at play here:
those that can lead a defendant to forego assurances against the risk
of another prosecution, and those that may lead the government to
decline to offer or sell the assurance. Either may be enough to preclude bargaining, or at least to preclude global agreements that fully
apportion the potential contractual gains.105
D. Resulting Agreements
These transaction costs and strategic obstacles explain why
defendants who fear successive prosecutions for uncharged offenses
may opt for a conventional agreement covering only the scope of the
indictment, discounting the government's sentencing concessions to
reflect the perceived risk of reprosecution. The existence of the barriers also suggests that defendants who negotiate expansive immunity
provisions can pay dearly for them.
Yet agreements are regularly negotiated with a variety of such
provisions. Some immunity provisions cover all charges that could
have been brought based on the facts in the indictment.16 Others are
tied to the scope of the government's investigation. 10 7 Some reach all
charges based on information that the government knew or should
have known. 10 8 Others cover specified crimes far beyond the scope of

defendants use of a false name to induce a plea agreement was fraud and justified rescission by
the prosecutor).
105. For a more elaborate discussion, in the Hadley context, of how strategic inefficiencies
develop where, as in the plea agreement bargaining context, information is asymmetric and one
side has market power, see Ayres and Gertner, 101 Yale L. J. at 729 (cited in note 12).
106. See, for example, United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065, 1072 (2d Cir. 1985)
(discussing plea to "cover all charges that could have come about by the government arising out
of these facts"); United States v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1027 (1st Cir. 1988) (discussing agreement for no further prosecution "for any criminal acts related to thefts or hijacking of vans"
committed by the defendant prior to the specified date).
107. See, for example, United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1992)
(agreement "not to file any additional criminal charges ... which are known to [the prosecutor]
arising from [the defendant's] criminal activities" in the district); Hawes, 774 F. Supp. at 967
(discussing agreement for no further prosecution "for any of the transactions involved in this
investigation"); United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing agreement not to "file any charges against the Defendant based on conduct known to the government"); United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 296 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing agreement for
no further prosecution for "any other possible violations of criminal law arising from the offenses set out in the indictment or the investigation giving rise to those charges").
108. See, for example, State v. Smith, 244 Kan. 283, 767 P.2d 1302, 1303 (1989) (discussing
agreement for no further charges based on "information presently known or which should be
known" by the district attorney's office) (emphasis omitted).
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the government's investigation. 10 9 In still others, to limit the risk of
misapprehending a defendant's culpability, the government ties immunity to the scope of defendant's proffer. 110 Some agreements also
explicitly bind other prosecuting authorities,"' or at least convey some
112
assurance that other offices will not bring cases.
This, then, is the stark world created by minimalist double
jeopardy doctrine-a world where a plea-bargaining defendant aware
of uncharged criminal liability, but unwilling to commit his fate to the
vagaries of prosecutorial self-interest, must either significantly discount the value of the sentencing discount he is offered, or purchase
additional protection by disclosing the uncharged offenses. As will be
seen, this picture is incomplete, since courts have used the Due
Process Clause to derive "expansive" 1 3 default rules that protect defendants beyond the explicit terms of their plea agreements.
Nevertheless, an exploration of a world in which the Double Jeopardy
Clause provides the only default protection-and in which defendants
can be penalized for failing to volunteer private information about
uncharged crimes-provides a vantage point from which to appreciate
the effects of supplemental rules that allow some defendants to resolve their dilemmas without risk or disclosure.

109. See, for example, Austin v. State, 49 Wisc. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56, 57-59 (1971)
(describing Wisconsin's "read in" procedure: after a defendant pled in satisfaction of the
indictment, other uncharged crimes could be "read in" and considered at sentencing; the
defendant had the protection of the statutory maximums of the charged crimes and could not
thereafter be prosecuted for the "read in" offenses).
110. See, for example, United States v. Nyhuis, 8 F.3d 731, 733 (11th Cir. 1993) CThe
government agrees not to bring additional criminal charges against the defendant in [one
federal district] arising out of his involvement in the distribution of marijuana and those transactions disclosed by the defendant in the proffer already made to the government."); BNA
Criminal PracticeManual 71:118 T 5 (Pike & Fischer, Inc., 1996) (providing sample agreement
that bars further charges against defendant "based on occurrences prior to the execution of this
agreement, provided that such offenses are known or could with reasonable diligence have been
discovered by the government by that date, or are disclosed to the Government by the
defendant!').
111. See, for example, Allen v. Hadden, 57 F.3d 1529, 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
defendant's parallel state and federal agreements regarding state and federal charges arising
out of drug conspiracy; United States v. Crumbley, 872 F.2d 975, 976 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussing
defendants joint plea agreement with state and federal prosecutors regarding state capital
murder charges and federal narcotics charges).
112. See, for example, Hawes, 774 F. Supp. at 967 (discussing the government's
representation "that it has contacted [the local district attorney] and can represent to the Court
that the State of North Carolina will not pursue any prosecution of this Defendant for any of the
transactions involved in this investigation").
113. The term comes from Johnston, 100 Yale L. J. at 618 (cited in note 12).
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IV. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION: GAP-FILLING DEFAULT RULES

The analysis thus far has assumed that the only default rule of
formal protection against successive prosecution is the Double
Jeopardy Clause: Absent an explicit immunity provision, a defendant's only recourse is Blockburger. This Part relaxes this assumption and examines the patchwork of judicially created due process protections that offer defendants immunity from future prosecution beyond the explicit terms of their plea agreements and double
jeopardy doctrine. The goal is to explore how these expansive defaults
offset the bargaining dynamics, and then to critique the justifications
offered for this additional protection.
A. The Rules
Some courts impose on prosecutors a reasonably narrow good
faith obligation that bars sandbagging. These courts hold that the
government may not intentionally nullify the explicit protections of a
plea agreement by bringing a charge that it could easily have brought
before and that is related to the offenses the agreement did address.114
Other courts go beyond this focus on intent, extending default immunity to all charges that stem from the transactions referred to in the
indictment and that the prosecution could have anticipated making
when it entered into the agreement. Where a defendant pleads guilty
pursuant to an agreement that makes no reference to possible murder
charges and the victim later dies, for example, these courts bar the
114. See United States v. Burns, 990 F.2d 1426, 1435 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the
government would have violated Due Process Clause if, in the first case, it had deliberately
delayed charging defendant with offense that it later brought in the second case, "in order to
reap the benefits of his bargained guilty plea while denying him the opportunity to seek a
concurrent sentence for related offenses"). See also United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139, 1154
(2d Cir. 1976) (having first determined that defendants agreement with the U.S. Attorney in
the Eastern District of New York did not bar the subsequent Southern District of New York
prosecution, the court noted: 'WVe would, of course, have a different case if there were evidence
to show that the Eastern District was attempting to evade its own obligations by transferring a
prosecution across the East River; but there is none"); United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp.
851, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (reaching same conclusion), affd, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1988).
Prosecutors may feel themselves bound to avoid sandbagging even when the law does not so
require. Frank W. Miller found that even though a Kansas statute barred "a subsequent
prosecution only for those offenses known to the prosecutors before the first trial and of which
evidence is admitted in the first trial," one Kansas prosecutor "stated that the underlying policy
against harassment by successive prosecutions expressed in this statute" would bar him from
charging any prior offense of which he had knowledge at the time of a defendant's trial, even
though evidence of the uncharged crime "was not admitted or even admissible" at the first trial.
Miller, Prosecutionat 188 n.5 (cited in note 69).
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successive murder prosecution that could not even have been brought
at the time of the defendant's plea."1 At least one state court has
gone further, presumptively barring any future charges that arise out
of the transactions referenced in the charges to which the defendant
pled." 6 Whether or not a prosecutor should have been able to
anticipate making the successive charges does not appear to be
relevant in this analysis.
Finally, in the absence of any explicit indication as to whether
a plea agreement binds other prosecuting offices within the same
sovereign's jurisdiction, some courts presume that the other offices
are bound."7 Although these default rules generally do not protect
115. See State v. Carpenter,68 Ohio St. 3d 59, 623 N.E.2d 66, 68 (1993) (barring prosecution on greater charges following victim's death noting that all parties anticipated risk of this
contingency); State v. Nelson, 23 Conn. App. 215, 579 A.2d 1104, 1106-07 (1990) (same). But see
People v. Latham, 609 N.Y.S.2d 141, 631 N.E.2d 83, 86 (1994) (finding no immunity for murder
charges in absence of evidence that "both the defendant and the prosecution intended the plea
to close the matter forever").
Long-established double jeopardy doctrine holds that even where Blockburger would otherwise bar the bringing of homicide charges after a defendanes conviction of a lesser included
offense, the second prosecution can go forward if the victim was still alive when the defendant
was first convicted. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516 n.7 (1990) (noting the Brown v. Ohio
exception); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977) (noting that an exception to the
Blockburger analysis "may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious
charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not
occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence"); Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442, 449 (1912) (finding no double jeopardy bar where the victim died after
defendant was convicted of assault and battery); In re Saul S., 213 Cal. Rptr. 541, 546 (Cal. App.
1985) (collecting state cases).
116. State v. Lordan, 116 N.H. 479, 363 A.2d 201, 203 (1976) ("Where the defendant commits several offenses in a single transaction and the prosecutor has knowledge of and jurisdiction over all these offenses and the defendant disposes of all charges then pending by a guilty
plea to one or more of the charges, the prosecutor may not prefer additional charges arising
from the same transaction unless either he has given notice on the record at the time of the plea
of the possibility that he may prefer further charges or the defendant otherwise knows or ought
reasonably to expect that further charges may be brought."). I am assuming that the Lordan
court did not believe that a defendanes knowledge of his own conduct gave sufficient notice of
the risk of future prosecution; a contrary assumption would render its rule virtually meaningless. See also United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1512 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that
the state prosecutor had no duty to tell defendant that the federal prosecutor was planning to
bring charges based on the same transaction, but reserving judgment as to whether such a duty
would arise had both prosecutors been instituted under the same sovereign).
117. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 296 n.1, 303 (4th Cir. 1986) (concluding
that in the absence of explicit indications to contrary, a plea agreement stating that "[t]he
Eastern District of Virginia further agrees not to prosecute [the defendant] for any other
possible violations of criminal law arising from the offenses set out in the indictment or the
investigation giving rise to those charges" and containing references to the "Government"
generally should be read to bind the entire U.S. government); State v. Burson, 698 S.W.2d 557,
560 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (presuming that the decision of one county attorney binds another);
People v. Wantland, 78 Ill. App. 3d 741, 397 N.E.2d 548, 552 (1979) (same). See also MargalliOlvera, 43 F.3d at 353 ("U]nless a plea agreement uses specific language that limits the agents
bound by the promise, ambiguities regarding the agencies bound by the agreement are to be
interpreted to bind the agency at issue."). But see United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 626 (2d
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defendants against future charges arising out of transactions not
alluded to in the indictments to which they plead, such rules do provide substantial additional immunity, particularly where charges in
the indictment are broadly framed.
The expansive default rules that courts have devised may vary,
but they all rest on the same general rationale. As the Fourth Circuit
explained in United States v. Harvey:"1 While drawing on the rules
for commercial contracts to resolve plea agreement disputes,
the courts have recognized that those rules have to be applied to plea agreements with two things in mind which may require their tempering in particular cases. First, the defendant's underlying "contract" right is constitutionally
based and therefore reflects concerns that differ fundamentally from and run
wider than those of commercial contract law. Second, with respect to federal
prosecutions, the courts' concerns run even wider than protection of the
defendant's individual constitutional rights-to concerns for the "honor of the
government, public confidence in the fair administration of justice, and the effective administration of justice in a federal scheme of government."" 9

This rationale has supported expansive rules that generally construe
contractual ambiguities against the government and impose a broad
duty of good faith dealing on prosecutors-a duty that protects defendants against many contingencies not explicitly addressed by their
20
plea agreements.
Even as Harvey reflects what Professor David Charny has
called a "fairness-based" conception of contract,' 2' there is a different
line of cases resolving plea disputes-a line reflecting more of an
Cir. 1986) (concluding that a plea agreement binds only the U.S. Attorney in the district where

the plea was entered unless "it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a

broader restriction") (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d
Cir. 1985)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings90-1 (Bullick), 754 F. Supp. 829, 832 & n.4 (D. Colo.
1990) (following Russo and rejecting Harvey); Laskow, 688 F. Supp. at 854 (following Annabi).
118. 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986).
119. Id. at 300 (quoting United States v. Carter,454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972)). See also
United States v. Herrera,928 F.2d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1991) ('Both constitutional and supervisory
concerns require holding the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the
defendant (or possibly than would be either of the parties to commercial contracts) for
imprecisions or ambiguities in plea agreements.") (quoting Harvey, 791 F.2d at 300)); United
States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541-42 (8th Cir. 1990) (discussing the limits of the contract law
analogy); United States v. Smith, 648 F. Supp. 495, 498 (S.D. Tex. 1986) ("Unlike contracts,
[p]lea [b]argains involve a myriad of collateral considerations such as expectations of
fundamental fairness by the Defendants, efficient administration of justice, and the integrity of
the Government's promises.").
120. See, for example, United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that
the government's sentencing presentation "effectively" violated its promise not to oppose a
three-level guidelines reduction for the defendant's acceptance of responsibility).
121. Charny, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 386 (cited in note 54).
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"autonomy-based" conception. 122 Less than a month after Harvey, the
2
Fourth Circuit noted in United States v. Fentress: 3
The prosecution owed [the defendant] no duty but that of fidelity to the
agreement. Neither the Constitution nor the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that a plea agreement must encompass all of the
significant actions that either side might take. If the agreement does not
possible sanctions,
establish a prosecutorial commitment on the full range of
1 24
we should recognize the parties' limitation of their assent.

On one level, the two Fourth Circuit cases can easily be reconciled: The contract in Harvey was found to be ambiguous; that in
Fentress was not. 12 5 In their recognition that the failure of an agreement to address a particular contingency can reflect a defendant's
conscious decision not to bargain any further, however, Fentress and
other cases 126 embody a very different approach to plea agreement
"gap"
filling. 127

122. Id. at 380. The two lines largely mirror what Clayton Gillette has called the "polar
extremes" of commercial contract analysis:
At one pole are bargains between "rugged" individuals who have no legal obligation to
assist each other in the absence of explicit agreements ....Each party has only those
obligations inferred from a literal reading of the contract ....At the other extreme lies
a more communitarian view of commercial relationalism ....[This conception of longterm relationships views commercial contract as necessarily (or at least presumptively)
a cooperative mechanism for reducing the risks that both parties face from an uncertain
future.
19 J. Legal Stud. at 538-40 (cited in note 86).
123. 792 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 464 (citations omitted). Fentressrelied on United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S.
453 (1985) (per curiam), where the Supreme Court overturned an appellate decision that
implied from the government's plea agreement promise to recommend a sentence a duty to
"express the justification for it." Id. at 454 (citation omitted). While the government could have
committed itself to explaining its recommendation, the Supreme Court noted, it did not do so
here and "it was error for the Court of Appeals to imply as a matter of law a term which the
parties themselves did not agree upon." Id. at 456.
125. Fentressdoes not cite to Harvey, but the Fourth Circuit, distinguishing Harvey elsewhere, has noted: "Where a written plea agreement is unambiguous, and there is no evidence of
governmental overreaching, the agreement should be interpreted and enforced according to the
terms contained therein." United States v. United Medical and Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d
1390, 1400-01 (4th Cir. 1993).
126. See, for example, United States v. Peglera, 33 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 1994) C'[T]he
government is held only to those promises that it actually made to the defendant."); United
States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139, 1154 (2d Cir. 1976) (refusing to infer an agreement to bind other
districts); State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) ('All authorities are agreed
that the construction of [a plea] agreement is to be had by the court from the record as a whole
and if the agreement is unambiguous there is no need to resort to so-called auxiliary rules of
construction or extraneous circumstances.") (citation omitted).
127. See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L. J. at 120 (cited in note 5) (Th[e] question of when a
contract is incomplete is identical to the question of what is sufficient to contract around a
default.").
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An approach that declines to extend protection to defendants
who could have paid for it, but did not, has a particular allure in the
context of uncharged crimes. Consider, by way of contrast, a dispute
over a common provision in plea agreements: the government's explicit promise to remain silent at sentencing. In the absence of any
explicit provision to the contrary, should the government also be
required to remain silent during post-conviction proceedings in which
the defendant moves for a reduction of sentence? 12s In this context, a
default rule obliging the government to remain silent would simply
compensate for a lapse in the imagination of defense counsel. The
defendant would have risked nothing in asking for an explicit commitment to such silence, and the government would likely not even
have "charged" the defendant for such a provision, since the essence of
the deal is to leave the sentence in the judge's hands. 129 A very different story, however, might lie behind an agreement's failure to address
explicitly whether a charge that is not jeopardy-barred can be brought
in the future. Because this "lapse" might well reflect a defendant's
decision to minimize his sentence by concealing the full extent of his
criminal liability, expansive default immunity rules may be harder to
justify.
B. Costs of Expansive Default Rules
Before critiquing the use of these expansive defaults, we start
with the Coasean question: Why do they matter?1s3 So long as the
government knows that courts will impose a default rule of protection,
it can reduce its sentencing concessions to reflect the possibility of
uncharged culpability immunized by the default rules; it can decline
to enter agreements with those defendants most likely to benefit from
the added protection, or it can bargain around the defaults, explicitly
overriding them in provisions that limit an agreement's scope. For
their part, defendants remain free to obtain larger concessions by
disavowing a need for the extra immunity.
128. See Daniel Frome Kaplan, Note, Where Promises End: ProsecutorialAdherence to
Sentence Recommendation Commitments in Plea Bargains, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 759-64

(1985).

129. See id. at 771-72 (arguing for such a default rule); State v. Wills, 244 Kan. 62, 765 P.2d
1114, 1120 (1988) (adopting rule). But see Brooks u. United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1281-82 (7th
Cir. 1983) (concluding that the prosecutor did not violate promise to make no sentencing
recommendation by opposing the defendant's later motion for reduction of sentence).
130. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). See also
Johnston, 100 Yale L. J. at 624 (cited in note 12) (describing Coasean contractual theory).
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In reality, however, the bargaining over future jeopardy will
never be so frictionless. To start, strategic considerations can deter
the governinent from routinely overriding the defaults-or at least
from trying to eliminate all risk of ambiguity from plea agreements.
If a prosecutor singles out a defendant and, by reserving the power to
reprosecute, makes him fear that informal protections will not suffice,
the defendant might seek a global settlement. But the risk is that
such disclosure will cause him to discount radically the government's
sentencing concessions and even take the case to trial. Selective
reservations will therefore have a cost. The aggregate cost could be
particularly high, since the risk-averse prosecutor-lacking knowledge of future contingencies such as how a judge will sentence, how
an investigation will develop, or how the community will respond to a
plea agreement-will likely preserve the option of future prosecution
131
more often than necessary.
Alternatively, to avoid sending selective signals that would
lead more defendants than necessary to discount informal protections,
the government could use standard form agreements that explicitly
override the default rules for all defendants. If all contracts were to
include these provisions, a rational and fully informed defendant
would have no greater reason to fear future prosecution than he
would under a regime without the provisions. The success of this
approach, however, would depend on the ability of defense counsel to
understand the irrelevance of the explicit disclaimers for most defendants and to explain them away to their clients' satisfaction, an ability the government is likely to doubt exists across the defense bar. To
be sure, defense counsel often receive criticism for pressuring clients
to plead, irrespective of the consequences. 32 Nonetheless, an unambiguous announcement of the possibility that future charges will be
brought would surely deter some pleas. 3 3 Moreover, the last thing
131. The risk-averse prosecutor will also fear that defaults turning on such slippery
matters as prosecutorial intent or the nature of the initially charged transaction will be applied
liberally, even erroneously, by judges who, with their own resource concerns, rarely see the
virtue of successive prosecutions.
132. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in PleaBargaining,84 Yale L. J.
1179, 1180-81 (1975) (asserting that the plea bargaining system encourages defense attorneys to
disregard their clients' best interests); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The
Empty Promise of the ConstitutionalRight to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 Hastings Const.
L. Q. 625, 672 (1986) (describing plea bargaining as a "mechanism for relieving the defender of
the need to prepare that case"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, PleaBargainingas Disaster,101 Yale L.
J. 1979, 1988-90 (1992) (describing the incentives defense attorneys have to avoid trial); Poor
Man's Justice: A Special Report on Indigent Defense, Thirty Years After Gideon, Am. Law. 45
(Jan/Feb. 1993) (discussing inadequacies of various indigent representation schemes).
133. I do not pretend to know the extent to which such an announcement would deter
defendants from pleading. I suspect that defendants now pleading guilty have learned to
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the government would want in this high-volume business would be for
large numbers of defense counsel to seek agreements precisely tailored to their clients' immunity needs.134 In the face of these strategic
obstacles, the frequency of cases in which the government has failed
to contract around expansive default rules is not surprising.
There are two possible systemic consequences of the government's tendency to rely upon the defaults. The first is that prosecutors are reducing the sentencing concessions that they offer to defendants whom they believe might benefit from the mandated protection
of the default rules. 135 The risk-averse prosecutor, generally lacking
information about the contingencies that might lead to a subsequent
decision (by his or another office) to reprosecute, thus makes many
defendants "pay" for protection that they do not need. Analogy can be
made to insurance law, where, as Professor Kenneth Abraham has
shown, judicial decisions purporting to protect insureds' "expectations
interests" by mandating greater coverage than that explicitly offered
by a policy lead the insurer to increase policy prices for everyone.13 6 In
both contexts, rulings motivated by concerns about unequal
bargaining power create a "pooling equilibrium" that discourages
individuals who desire additional formal protection from identifying

discount the judge's advice as to the "maximum possible penalty provided by law." F.R.Cr.P.
11(c). Perhaps they could also be taught to discount references to the possibility of successive
prosecution. I suggest only that the government would prefer not to place even greater reliance
on defense counsers ability to reassure clients.
134. See Eisenberg, 80 Cal. L. Rev. at 596 (cited in note 83) (noting in the context of the
Hadley rule:
"Most high-volume sellers of homogeneous commodities will not utilize
information concerning special circumstances to stratify precaution because the cost of
processing the information, stratifying precaution, or both will exceed the expected value of the
stratification.").
135. See OriginalGreat American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies
Co., Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) ("Courts deciding contract cases cannot
durably shift the balance of advantages to the weaker side of the market; they can only make
contracts most costly to that side in the future, because the [disfavored party] will demand
compensation for bearing onerous terms."); Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules
Analysis, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 59, 80 (1993) C'Since the application of relational standards
will increase the cost to type A parties of dealing with type B parties, the use of such standards
may decrease contracting opportunities for type B parties.").
136. Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1151, 1188 (1981) (noting that one
"possible byproduct of the risk spreading entailed in the expectations decisions is that they will
limit the insured's freedom of choice by involuntarily increasing the scope of the coverage he
purchases. Any increase in a policy's package of insurance protection will often increase its
price"). See also Kenneth S. Abraham, DistributingRisk. Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public
Policy 123-24 (Yale U., 1986).
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137
themselves and paying for it.
This adverse selection problem is
particularly unfortunate in the plea bargaining context, since the
defendants saddled with unnecessary coverage are less criminally
138
culpable than those who benefit.
This problem would be avoided if defendants who felt no need
for the protection of the defaults explicitly renounced such protection
in exchange for deeper sentencing discounts. But just as defendants
who do not need additional protection cannot be expected to ignore a
standard term overriding the defaults, 139 so will they also lack the
knowledge and confidence to negotiate for less immunity. Moreover,
even if, over time, defense lawyers were to realize and convince their
clients that protection-renouncing provisions did not increase the risk
of reprosecution, there would be little incentive to pursue such provisions. Lacking the confidence to distinguish between those defendants who eschewed protection because of limited liability and those
more culpable individuals who were merely gambling on the sufficiency of informal guarantees, the government would probably not
reward waivers.
To the extent that the government cannot shift the costs of the
additional immunity afforded by the judicial default rules to defendants, there is, of course, a very different consequence:
The
defendants who strategically choose to avoid disclosing private
information and negotiating an expensive global settlement are
getting some or all of the benefits of that settlement at no cost.140

C. Critiquingthe Justificationsfor Expansive Defaults
Judicially created default rules are not necessarily a bad idea
merely because they disregard strategic behavior by defendants and
may have adverse distributional consequences-that is, higher sentences for less culpable defendants or windfall protection for the more
137. See Baird, Gertner, and Pickner, Game Theory and the Law at 145 (cited in note 5)
(noting that laws imposing mandatory terms can "destroy an efficient separating equilibrium by
inhibit[ing] the flow of privately held information"). I do not mean to suggest that, in the
absence of default rules, the Double Jeopardy Clause would create a separating equilibrium;
indeed, I have argued the contrary. See Part III. But the pressure the clause places on
defendants to produce information is significantly relieved by the default rules.
138. See Abraham, 67 Va. L. Rev. at 1187 (cited in note 136) ("Other things being equal, it
would seem fairer to pool risks where insureds have no control over risk-increasing characteris.
tics than where they do.").
139. See notes 132-33.
140. See United States v. Standefer, 948 F.2d 426, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that defendant's plea to federal narcotics charges in Idaho did not bar related federal conspiracy
charges in Arkansas, the court notes that defendants had "tried but failed to negotiate a provision in [the] Idaho plea agreement barring further prosecution in Arkansas").

1996]

FUTURE JEOPARDY

1219

culpable. If notions of fair play and a sovereign's obligations to all
citizens demanded that the limitations on the government's freedom
of action be presumed to go beyond the explicit terms of a plea agreement and the minimalist protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
we would accept such costs. But these costs do put pressure on the
justifications offered for such rules. Does fairness really dictate
them?
Pressure also comes from prevailing double jeopardy doctrine.
As a normative matter, some might applaud the dynamic created by
minimalist protection, which can penalize defendants who fail to
disclose the full extent of their potential criminal liability. Others
might find such coercion offensive to the values of both the Double
Jeopardy Clause and the privilege against self-incrimination. So long
as Blockburger reigns, however, presenting defendants with the strategic dilemma described above, those who would devise expansive
defaults that eliminate or ease the dilemma must justify this additional protection.
Few would doubt the propriety, as a general matter, of imposing some duty of good faith on prosecutors. Courts have broadly imposed such a duty on all contracting parties.'14 And a prosecutor is no
ordinary party, but "the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." 4 2 Given
that double jeopardy doctrine has developed without reference to
whether a defendant pleaded guilty or went to trial, it seems entirely
appropriate to look to the Due Process Clause or, if necessary, judicial
supervisory powers to promote the integrity of the bargaining process
and to protect defendants against government overreaching in that
context. The issue is thus not whether special obligations should be
imposed on the government at all, but whether the justifications
offered for expansive defaults satisfactorily explain the rules chosen,
or indeed counsel the imposition of any specific defaults, particularly
of defaults that mitigate the information-forcing effects of double
jeopardy doctrine. Generally speaking, they do not.
141. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981) ('Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."); Steven J.
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 369, 404 (1980) (collecting cases that explicitly recognize a general duty of good faith in
every contract).
142. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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1. Reasonable Expectations
When imposing defaults, courts often look to a defendant's
"reasonable expectations."'
This is an appropriate starting point,
given the Supreme Court's plea bargaining analysis: A defendant's
waiver of his sixth amendment rights cannot stand unless it was
intelligently given, and it cannot be intelligent if the defendant does
not fully understand the benefits and limits of the government's plea
concessions.'" Although a waiver approach, taken to its logical conclusion, might argue for a purely subjective inquiry into a defendant's
expectations, courts have always looked to objective reasonableness145
But how is one to determine what expectations are reasonable?
Again, there are parallels to insurance law. Professor Abraham
distinguishes between cases holding an insurer to those expectations
it directly created, through its policy or its conduct, and cases in
143. See, for example, Harvey, 791 F.2d at 302-03 (4th Cir. 1986) (concluding that one could
reasonably understand the agreement as prohibiting further prosecutions by any agency of the
government); State v. Carpenter,68 Ohio St. 3d 59, 623 N.E.2d 66, 68 (1993) (finding that the
defendant reasonably expected that by pleading "he was terminating the incident and could not
be called on to account further on any charges regarding this incident").
144. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984) (noting that a due process challenge
exists if the defendant is not fully informed of the consequences of his or her plea); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) ("Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced
by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and the apparent likelihood of
securing leniency should a guilty plea by offered and accepted"); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242-43 (1969) (concluding that a defendant's guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent);
United States v. Birdwell, 887 F.2d 643, 645 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Harvey, 791 F.2d at 300-01
(same). See also Westen and Westin, 66 Cal. L. Rev. at 501-12 (cited in note 14) (discussing how
the intelligence requirement for a waiver of a constitutional right can be satisfied by directing
specific performance of a plea bargain); Kaplan, Note, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 768-69 (cited in note
128) (discussing the need for an intelligent waiver of a constitutional right); George E. Dix,
Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 193, 214-15
(1977) (discussing the need for intelligence or awareness and how it differs from voluntariness).
145. See United States v. Partida-Parra,859 F.2d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Any dispute
over the terms of the agreement must be resolved by determining, under an objective standard,
'what the parties to the plea bargain reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.' ")
(quoting United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Giorgi,
840 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir. 1988) ('Any mistaken belief held by [the defendant as to the scope
of his plea agreement] was purely subjective and poses no bar to the instant prosecution");
United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1517 (11th Cir. 1986) ("It is well established in this
Circuit that a defendant's belief as to the scope of the plea agreement does not control the scope
of the agreement."); United States v. Oliverio, 706 F.2d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
defendant "cannot now rely on his mistaken subjective impression of the effect of his earlier
guilty plea as a bar to [further] prosecution").
The analysis here is restricted to the Due Process Clause. Where defense counsel is responsible for creating objectively unreasonable expectations as to the scope of a plea agreement,
the defendant may still pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge to his conviction.
See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 949 (1st Cir. 1973) (stating that failure of defense
counsel to know the relevant law will amount to ineffective assistance of counsel); Ex parte
Griffin, 679 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (concluding that guilty plea is invalid if
induced by defense counsel's misrepresentations about the State's promised concessions).
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which the insurer cannot fairly be held responsible for creating the
insured's expectations. In the latter instance, a court's expectations
analysis may mask the importation of some principle of substantive
6
fairness.14
The easy cases are those in which the government affirmatively misleads the defendant as to the scope of a written plea agreement.14 7 We need not address expansive default rules in this context.
Even a minimalist conception of the government's due process obligations would bind the prosecutor who failed to correct misimpressions
she herself created.
The more difficult cases are those in which the government
does nothing to suggest that a plea agreement might give a defendant
any immunity beyond that explicitly promised by the agreement or
offered by double jeopardy doctrine. In such cases, as in the insurance context, vague talk of defendant expectations may mask judicial
discomfort with the Supreme Court's minimalist approach to double
jeopardy doctrine. The judge who, for example, wishes that the
Supreme Court had adopted Justice Brennan's transaction-based
analysis of successive prosecution double jeopardy questions " a instead
of Blockburger, might presume that a defendant's expectation of
149
immunity encompasses all offenses related to charged transactions.
The question thus becomes whether expectations-based immunity decisions rest on something besides conscientious objection. To
ask whether a particular defendant would have entered his plea if he
had realized that additional charges could still be brought 150 does not
146. Abraham, 67 Va. L. Rev. at 1180 (cited in note 136).
147. See, for example, United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that although the text of the plea agreement made no reference to fines, the agreement
precluded fine imposition because the government had indicated that "no fine would be
imposed"); In re Arnett, 804 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that without express
warning in written plea agreement, it was reasonable for defendant to rely on prior oral
understanding with prosecutor).
148. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 170 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the Double Jeopardy
Clause "requires the prosecution in one proceeding.., of 'all the charges against a defendant
that grow out of a single criminal act, occurence, episode, or transaction"') (quoting Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
149. Because plea agreement issues will generally be perceived as fact-bound, a lower court
judge chafing at the Supreme Court's minimalist double jeopardy doctrine will likely be
insulated against Supreme Court, or even rigorous, appellate review if she bases her finding of
immunity on the Due Process Clause (or supervisory powers) and her reading of the agreement.
150. See, for example, State v. Nelson, 23 Conn. App. 215, 579 A.2d 1104, 1107 (1990)
(barring the prosecution of new charges based on the victim's death after the defendant had
negotiated a plea, the court notes: '"Ve question whether the defendant would have given her
assent to a prison term if she thought that additional, more serious charges could be brought
later.... It would be illogical to conclude that the defendant would have agreed to a three-year
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advance the analysis, given the consensus that a purely subjective
standard is to be avoided. If the standard is to be objective reasonableness, however, how does one distinguish between agreements
whose failure to address an unbrought charge reflects an expectation
of coverage and those whose gap reflects an unsuccessful gamble that
informal protections would suffice? 151
A fair inquiry into a defendant's expectations about the scope
of future immunity would have to consider how his private knowledge
of his own conduct might have shaped those expectations. Not surprisingly, courts are loath to pursue this avenue, but their failure to
do so renders talk of "expectations" rather hollow.152
Ultimately, inquiries into objective expectations focus on what
a defendant legitimately might expect of his bargaining counterpart.
Indeed, this must be the case if one is to justify giving defendants who
plead guilty protections that are unavailable to those who stand trial.
No one has ever suggested using the Due Process Clause to protect
the expectations, however reasonable, of the defendant who chooses
trial because he mistakenly thinks he will never be prosecuted again.
The "reasonable expectations" analysis thus tends to collapse into an
examination of the scope of "good faith duty."

term of imprisonment if she believed that it was perhaps only the first installment on a
lengthier term to be imposed if [the victim] died."); Carpenter,623 N.E.2d at 68 (reaching the
same conclusion).
151. Rejecting a defendant's claim that his agreement in the Eastern District of New York
bound prosecutors in the Southern District of New York, Judge Friendly noted:
We can only conclude that insofar as the plea bargain can be understood to confer an
immunity from narcotics law prosecutions greater than that given by the Double
Jeopardy Clause, it was not in the contemplation of either side that anyone outside of
the Eastern District U.S. Attorney's or Strike Force Offices was bound. While this gave
the defendants less than complete protection, their attorneys were doubtless more interested in nailing down the substantial concessions they had already achieved than in
having further inquiry made. From [the prosecutor's] point of view, the limitation is
certainly intelligible; he had good cause for not wanting to bind another Office which he
had not consulted.
Alessi, 544 F.2d at 1154.
152. See Craswell, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. at 101-02 (cited in note 16) (questioning the persuasiveness of arguments that demand respect for party expectations irrespective of legitimacy
or social utility).
The common inability to process low probability events correctly, see Gillette, 19 J. Legal
Stud. at 553 (cited in note 86); Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization,4 J.
L. Econ. & Org. 65, 68-69 (1988), might counsel solicitude for defendants who disregard or
unduly discount the risk of reprosecution. We first need a theory, however, as to why we should
compensate for the errors of a defendant who pleads guilty to specified crimes when we do not
compensate for the errors of a rational but careless defendant who has miscalculated the risks
of prosecution. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment. An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169 (1968). Indeed, the defendant prosecuted once is generally less likely to face another
case. See Part II.B and C.
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2. Good Faith Duty
All courts that have spoken on the issue have suggested that,
notwithstanding a plea agreement explicitly addressing only pending
counts, the government cannot charge a defendant with a different
count, arising out of the same transaction(s), that it could easily have
brought the first time. 153 But what if the new charge arises out of a
154
different transaction? On this question, courts are less consistent.
Moreover, they have yet to establish a clear framework for deciding
when one prosecuting office's cooperation with other authorities
amounts to a bad faith circumvention of its contractual obligations. 155
The caselaw's ambiguity as to the scope of any good faith duty
in the context of plea bargaining is understandable given the indeterminacy of contract theory on this point. Indeed, Professor Robert
Summers, whose work "substantially influenced the recognition and

153. See note 114. See also United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1234 (9th Cir. 1980).
154. In Krasn, the prosecutor negotiating the defendant's plea to gratuity and bribery
charges knew that an antitrust investigation into the defendants activities was pending, but
said nothing. When antitrust charges were brought, and the defendant claimed bad faith, the
Ninth Circuit noted that, in certain cases, the prosecutor's "duty of good faith would encompass
an obligation to inform a defendant during plea bargain negotiations of other possible criminal
charges which may be filed. This, however, was not such a case" 614 F.2d at 1234. Critical to
the court's analysis was the fact that the antitrust charge involved "independent' criminal
transactions, and that the antitrust probe had been in 'at most, only.., a preliminary stage"
when the defendant had entered his plea. Id. The court noted that, had the antitrust case been
ready to be "submitt[ed] to the grand jury during the plea negotiations on the gratuities
charges, then a different result might be required." Id.
But in United States v. Strawser, 739 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1984), the court noted that the
governments knowledge, while negotiating a narcotics plea, of another narcotics transaction
involving the defendant would not bar a subsequent prosecution based on the uncharged
transaction. Id. at 1231 n.5. The court reasoned that the agreement, by its terms, "was only
meant to cover the offenses charged in the first indictment." Id. See also United States v.
Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179, 1186 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the defendant "cites no authority
suggesting that the government must inform a criminal defendant about all known evidence
concerning non-charged offenses, so that the defendant can seek to negotiate the preclusion of
prosecution on those offenses").
155. In Alessi, after finding that the defendants agreement with the U.S. Attorney in the
Eastern District of New York did not bar a subsequent Southern District of New York
prosecution, the court noted: 'Ve would, of course, have a different case if there were evidence
to show that the Eastern District was attempting to evade its own obligations by transferring a
prosecution across the East River, but there is none." 544 F.2d at 1154. See also Laskow, 688
F. Supp. at 855 (reaching the same conclusion). In Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985),
Georgia authorities, after extracting a murder plea from a defendant seeking to avoid the death
penalty, proceeded to play a significant role in Alabama's capital murder prosecution of the
same defendant for the same murder. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Upholding the
defendant's Alabama capital murder conviction, the Supreme Court addressed only the dual
sovereignty double jeopardy issue, and said nothing about the conduct of the Georgia
authorities. Id. at 91-93. See note 199.
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conceptualization of good faith" in section 205 of the Second
Restatement of Contracts,156 has found virtue in that provision's lack
of a determinative formulation and has celebrated it for proscribing
"highly varied forms of bad faith, many of which become identifiable
only in the context of circumstantial detail of a kind that defies
comprehensive formulation in a single rule."'157 Yet whatever
formulation is used, issues of good faith ultimately must turn on some
conception of what it was that a promisor covenanted to furnish or
5
forego. 1
Any effort to ground expansive default rules on some notion of
good faith thus must explain why our conception of what a prosecutor
"really" sells in a plea bargain should be based on something other
than the counts in the indictment-the legislatively defined unit of
consideration used in prevailing double jeopardy doctrine. This is
particularly true once we remember that a defendant may be better
placed than the government to calculate how much of his potential
criminal liability his plea has expressly addressed, and what risks of
reprosecution therefore remain. 59
Perhaps an argument of "customary practice" might be
16
made: 0 Because a defendant who pleads guilty is rarely reprosecuted, he can legitimately expect some degree of repose greater than
156. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization,67 Cornell L. Rev. 810, 810 (1982) (referring to Robert S. Summers, "Good
Faith"in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
Va. L. Rev. 195 (1968)).
157. Id. at 821. But see Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith,
1981 Duke L. J. 619, 621-26, 643-47 (concluding that the concept of good faith is overbroad and
internally incoherent).

158. See, for example, Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 188 N.E.
163, 167 (1933) ('[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing."); Burton, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 373 (cited in note 141)
('Good faith performance . ..occurs when a party's discretion is exercised for any purpose
within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation-to capture opportunities that were preserved upon entering the contract, interpreted objectively."); Eric M.
Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in Contract
Formation, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 381, 452 (1978) (noting that good faith consists of acting
"according to reasonable standards set by customary practices and by known individual expectations").
159. See Burton, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 386 (cited in note 141) (concluding that a breach of the
good faith performance standard occurs "if a party uses its discretion for a reason outside the
contemplated range-a reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming a breach").
160. Id. at 389 ("Expectations as to specific foregone opportunities may be inferred from the
express contract terms in light of the ordinary course of business and customary practice, in
accordance with the objective theory of contract interpretation."). See also Steven J. Burton,
Default Principles,Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S.Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 115,
117-18 (1993) (arguing that defaults must be grounded in convention).
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that defined by the indictment or express plea provisions. But this
argument is unacceptably circular, and, in any case, is belied by the
readiness of many defendants to contract expressly for the protection
mandated by the various default rules.161
In the end, although "good faith" seems like something that
prosecutors ought to have, the concept provides no more than conclusory support for any scheme of expansive defaults with respect to
future jeopardy. This is particularly true for defaults that do not turn
on prosecutorial intent or the substance of plea negotiations. Courts
that derive special protections from this concept for all defendants
who plead guilty, without more, may be doing equity, subsidizing the
plea bargaining process, or encouraging prosecutorial efficiency. The
doctrinal means they have chosen to further these ends, however, do
not withstand serious analysis.
3. Sophistication of Parties
A more powerful argument for expansive default rules protecting against successive prosecutions arises out of concern about the
quality of representation that most defendants receive.
Even if
to
leave
a
defendant
well-placed
knowledge of his own conduct could
deal with the risk of successive prosecution, he cannot plan without
knowing what the default rule is and the extent of immunity that a
plea will give him.
Professors Ayres and Gertner observe that where contracting
parties have different information about the default rule,
[s]etting a default rule that least favors the better informed parties creates an
incentive for the informed party to bring up the relevant contingency in negotiations. This can signal the uninformed party that the contingency is important and can cause her to become informed about the probability that the contingency will occur. Thus, the default rule can cause the parties
to negotiate
162
for explicit terms in the contract, thereby overriding the default.

This point, they note, "is especially relevant in settings where a repeat player is contracting with a one-shot player."163
161. Moreover, even if a "convention" could be said to exist, that, without more analysis,
would not justify the creation of expansive defaults. See Clayton P. Gillette, Cooperationand
Convention in ContractualDefaults, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 167, 176-77 (1993) (criticizing
Burton's analysis).
162. Ayres and Gertner, 101 Yale L. J. at 760-61 (cited in note 12).
163. Id. at 761. See also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 886-88 (1992).
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Although the defense lawyers who can advise defendants as to
the risks assumed in a plea are generally repeat players,164 we cannot
be confident that their advice would sufficiently convey the extremely
limited scope of double jeopardy doctrine-the default rule in the
absence of due process-based extensions. This agency problem has
two aspects, one factual and the other legal. While a defendant may
indeed have private information about his uncharged culpability, our
knowledge of the barriers to attorney-client communication ' 65 should
preclude any assumption that he will pass this information on to his
lawyer, especially given that his thoughts will likely center on the
pending charges. For her part, defense counsel, paid to dispose of the
pending case,1 66 might be insufficiently interested in pursuing information about uncharged crimes. Moreover, even a lawyer fully informed of these facts would not be able to elucidate his client's options
without a full understanding of the complexities of double jeopardy
doctrine and default rules, certainly not an intuitively obvious area of
law.167
These factors suggest that even where the government lacks
access to information about a defendant's uncharged culpability, a
prosecutor is generally in a far better position to understand the
dimensions, and limitations, of a default than is a defendant. Such
asymmetry of information as to the operative default argues for obliging the prosecutor who wants to profit from double jeopardy doctrine's
minimalist protection to make the limitations of that doctrine clear in
plea agreements, which are generally drafted by the government.
Recognition of this information gap thus justifies a scheme of expansive defaults, but it certainly would not preclude considering the

164. See note 59 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
665 (1984) (refusing to presume that a real estate lawyer trying first criminal case will render

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel).
165. See, for example, Jonathan D. Casper, Criminal Courts: The Defendant's Perspective
(1978) (discussing how defendants view their public defenders); Stephen Eliman, Lawyers and
Clients, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 717 (1987) (describing the control of lawyers over implementing and
making client choices); Roy B. Flemming, Client Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their
Relations With Criminal Clients, 1986 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 253 (examining relations between
criminal defense lawyers and their clients and the lack of client control); Jonathan D. Casper,
Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No I Had a PublicDefender, 1 Yale Rev. L. &
Soc. Action 4 (1971).
166. See Richman, 56 Ohio St. L. J. at 112-14 (cited in note 6).
167. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (noting that the Supreme Court's
double jeopardy decisions "can hardly be characterized as models of consistency and clarity").
Perhaps defendants truly at risk for reprosecution-like our hypothetical S & L executive-are
somewhat more likely to be from that segment of society able to afford reliably high quality
representation. But this is sheer speculation.
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possibility that certain defendants may indeed be pursuing a con6
scious strategy of non-disclosure.1S
D. A Scheme of Default Rules
Were defendants fully aware of the information-forcing pressures created by minimalist fifth amendment doctrine, notions of the
government's "good faith" obligations or defendants' "reasonable expectations" would not satisfactorily justify the particular measures
taken by courts to ameliorate their strategic dilemma. But we cannot
presume defendant knowledge of relevant defaults, and, at the very
least, our courts are ill-suited to distinguish among defendants based
on their degree of sophistication or access to information.169 Nor can
we disregard the high costs or inefficacy of default rules-like the one
prohibiting sandbagging-that turn on retrospective inquiries into
0
prosecutorial motivation.Y
The problem with the current hodgepodge of defaults, however,
is that they tend to give an unjustified benefit to some defendants,
and inadequate protection to others. Let us consider instead a rationalized regime of expansive defaults-a scheme that forces the government to clarify the limits of immunity where defendants are most
likely to have misconceptions, but attempts to separate out those
cases in which a defendant is most likely to be pursuing a conscious
strategy of non-disclosure.
1. Scenario A: The Separate Transaction
The first scenario is the least controversial. Where a defendant pleads guilty to offenses arising out of a single transaction, he
should have no right to presume that his plea gives immunity from a
second prosecution arising out of a different transaction. This is the
case even where the government could easily have brought both sets
168. See United States v. Macehia, 861 F. Supp. 182, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that the
plea agreement did not bar subsequent prosecution, the court notes the experience of defense
counsel and observes that if the parties had intended the agreement to grant such immunity
"they surely could have chosen words to effectuate this intent'), appeal dismissed, 41 F.3d 35
(2d Cir. 1994).
169. See Charny, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 446 (cited in note 54) (discussing costs incurred by
parties and courts where judicial readiness to enforce nonlegal commitments turns on the
capabilities of transactors).
170. See Steven Alan Reiss, ProsecutorialIntent in Constitutional CriminalProcedure,135
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1365, 1429-35 (1987) (discussing the systemic costs of doctrinal schemes that turn
on prosecutorial intent).
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of charges together, and where its second case effectively nullifies
(perhaps intentionally) the sentencing concessions made in the first
proceeding.171 Because even the most marginally represented defendant should still recognize when an indictment and/or plea agreement
is bereft of reference to a separate transaction, establishing an expansive default in this context would only reward those who have consciously declined to enter broader negotiations. Not surprisingly, few
if any courts would consider such a rule.172 It is simply too far a
stretch to presume that the government's willingness to offer a deal
on one crime implicitly promises immunity as to others. Thus, absent
affirmatively misleading conduct by the government, no default rule
of immunity from a second prosecution should be imposed-even
where the government could have brought the subsequent charges at
the outset. Since no restraint on the government is justified by the
nature of the bargaining process, this defendant should have no more
protection against successive prosecution than a co-defendant who
73
stands trial in the initial case.
2. Scenario B: The Additional Offense Relating to the Same
Transaction
The second scenario involves charges arising out of a single
transaction: Defendant pleads guilty to one count of a two-count
indictment, pursuant to an agreement providing only that the remaining count will be dismissed at sentencing. At no point during negotiations or court proceedings does the government make or suggest any
promise of additional immunity. Thereafter, the same prosecuting
office charges the defendant with offense number three, based on the
same transaction as the initial two counts. Offense number three
might, for example, involve defendant's possession of a gun during the
drug deal charged in the first indictment, if he is a convicted felon.174
171. See State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 856, 856-57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that charges
arising out of defendant's prior sale to undercover officer were brought after defendant was
sentenced pursuant to plea agreement addressing charges arising out of raid on defendant's

house).
172. See note 154.

173. The pleading defendant would thus have the same protection against "vindictive"
successive prosecutions-that is, prosecutions brought to punish him for excercising a legal
right, or to chill him from doing so-that his co-defendant has. See note 72.
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994 ed.) (making it unlawful for a person convicted of any
crime punishable by over one year of imprisonment to "possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce"). Because there is no overlap between the
elements of this offense and those of drug distribution, the second prosecution would not violate
Blockburger. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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There are several versions of this scenario:
In version one, the defendant's possession of the gun will not be
private information in the first case, and the defendant will be aware
of the symmetry. Either he will have volunteered that fact during
negotiations, plea allocution, or some other context, or the government will have evidenced its knowledge. Where there is little likelihood that the defendant had any strategic reason for failing to ask
that immunity against offense number three be included in his plea
agreement, we may fairly presume that he expected such immunity,
and that the government is simply trying to nullify its sentencing
concessions. A default rule protecting this defendant in the absence
of government clarification would thus seem eminently appropriate.
The breadth of such a rule should not be underestimated, since
it would cover many situations where Blockburger's protection seems
particularly illusory; for example, cases in which technical differences
in statutory elements are all that distinguish two prosecutions. 175 In
recognition of Blockburgers counterintuitive narrowness, this default
rule could also be extended to presume protection against a subsequent charge that technically is not barred by Blockburger, but whose
factual basis is not "materially" different from that of the counts to
which the defendant pled. A defendant would thus not need to show
that the government knew that the mails or wires had been used to
commit a bank fraud before we would presume that a plea to bank
fraud brought immunity against the same conduct charged as a mail
or wire fraud.
In version two, our hypothetical gun is private information, so
far as the defendant is aware. Neither he nor the government alluded
to that fact during formal proceedings or negotiations. 176 The second
prosecution may have resulted either from the government's belated
discovery of the fact, or from intentional sandbagging. The cause
should not matter; in either case, the defendant's immunity should
not extend beyond the explicit terms of his plea agreement or double
jeopardy doctrine. So long as the undisclosed fact is not one whose
significance a defendant or defense lawyer is likely to miss (like
175. See note 24.
176. United States v. Flores-Peraza,58 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 1995), shows a similar sequence
of events. The defendant was arrested after illegally entering the country and immediately pled
guilty to the misdemeanor of unlawful entry at a place other than as designated by immigration
officers. Id. at 165. Two weeks later, after a fingerprint check showed him to have previously
been deported, he was charged with being in the United States after deportation without
authorization. Id.
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whether defendant carried a gun during the crime), considerations of
"good faith" or "reasonable expectations" no more demand the restriction of prosecutorial discretion here than they do where a successive
prosecution arises out of a different transaction.
To be sure, where the government holds back on a charge in
order to bring it in another case, it stands in the best position to predict that such a prosecution will be brought. Once recharacterized as
the government's failure to disclose that it has information about the
defendant's own conduct, however, sandbagging does not seem so
reprehensible. Indeed, courts have long held that the government's
due process obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant
does not extend to information that he already knows or that is oth177
erwise available to him.
Moreover, a rule against sandbagging, however easy to
announce in the abstract, cannot easily be enforced, or even applied in
specific cases. At what point is a charge ready to be brought, such
that any further delay bespeaks an improper motivation? Is it when
the government knows of the underlying conduct?
When the
prosecution has enough evidence to obtain an indictment? Or is it
when the government has evidence sufficient to prevail at trial? The
more subjective the measure, the harder the factfinding. 178 Moreover,
assuming courts could negotiate these hurdles, issues of a
motivation's propriety remain:
Is it sandbagging when the
government holds back a charge that would implicate another
individual against whom investigation is not complete?179 The intent
would not be to nullify a plea deal, but the effect would be the same.
177. See Blackmon v. Scott, 22 F.3d 560, 565 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding no due process violation in failure to reveal witness's statement about defendant's jealous nature because the
defendant was aware of his own jealous tendencies); United States v. Hicks, 848 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st
Cir. 1988) (finding that the government does not have to disclose a witness's testimony where
the defense is aware of the witness); United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982)
(noting that evidence is not "suppressed" if the defendant was aware of it).
178. In its decisions making pre-indictment delay virtually unreviewable, the Supreme
Court has recognized how difficult it would be for courts to ascertain when a case was "ready."
See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 793 (1977) (noting the procedural problems that
would arise if the right to a speedy trial applied to the period before indictment); United States
v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 n.13 (1971) (noting that reasonable minds can differ on when the
prosecutor has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction).
179. In Lovasco, when explaining why the government ought not be required to bring
charges promptly once it has "assembled sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt," the Court noted,

[Compelling a prosecutor to file public charges as soon as the requisite proof has been
developed against one participant on one charge would cause numerous problems in
those cases in which a criminal transaction involves more than one person or more than
one illegal act. In some instances, an immediate arrest or indictment would impair the
prosecutor's ability to continue his investigation, thereby preventing society from
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Even without the oft-proclaimed, but never enforced, rule
against sandbagging,1 80 the proposed scheme would still protect a
defendant against a future prosecution arising out of a fact of unknown significance. Such facts are most likely those integral to the
charged transaction, and consequently should come out during the
charging, negotiation, or sentencing process. At most, the absence of
an expansive default would merely encourage defendants to develop a
more complete factual record in their plea or sentencing allocutions. 181
Version three also involves offenses arising out of a charged
transaction, but here, information critical to the uncharged offenses is
equally accessible to defense and prosecution. A defendant, for
example, pleads to offenses relating to an automobile mishap, but
then faces homicide charges after the victim dies. 8 2 Lacking any special insight into the victim's condition, he could reasonably understand the government's sentencing discount to reflect the possibility
that his victim might die.183 It does not matter what the default rule
is here, as long as both parties know what it is. The prosecution's
presumptively superior knowledge of defaults argues for a rule requir-

bringing lawbreakers to justice. In other cases, the prosecutor would be able to obtain
additional indictments despite an early prosecution, but the necessary result would be
multiple trials involving a single set of facts.
431 U.S. at 792-93.
180. See note 114
181. More complete allocutions can only add to reliability of pleas and encourage ostensible
acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176, 181 (5th Cir. 1994)
(finding that defendant who refused to acknowledge essential elements of offense at plea and
sentencing was properly denied reduction under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
"acceptance of responsibility").
Defendant candor at sentencing, or before, was recently encouraged through the enactment
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994), which created a "safety valve" provision, enabling certain non-violent drug
offenders to escape harsh statutory mandatory minimum sentences by providing the
government with truthful information about their crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3553() (1994 ed.). See
United States v. Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[D]efendants seeking to avail
themselves of downward departures under § 3553(o bear the burden of affirmatively acting, no
later than sentencing, to ensure that the Government is truthfully provided with all information
and evidence the defendants have concerning the relevant crimes.").
182. See Carpenter,623 N.E.2d at 67 (denying the state the right to file further charges on
similar facts); Nelson, 579 A.2d at 1106-07 (same); People v. Latham, 609 N.Y.S.2d 141, 631
N.E.2d 83, 86 (1994) (finding no immunity for murder charges in absence of evidence that "both
the defendant and the prosecution intended the plea to close the matter forever").
183. Again, analogy might be made to insurance law, particularly to the doctrine that an
insured seeking coverage against a future contingency is not bound to disclose information
about the risk that is equally available to the insurer. See the discussion of Carterv. Boehm, 97
Eng. Rep. 1162 (K.B. 1766), in Holmes, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 426-35, 445-46 (cited in note 158).
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ing the government explicitly to reserve the power to bring homicide
84
charges (if it wishes to have that option).
3. Scenario C: Multiple Prosecutors Under the Same Sovereign
In Scenario C, the successive prosecution is not brought by the
prosecutor who negotiated a defendant's plea agreement, but by another office operating within the same sovereign jurisdiction-another
District Attorney or U.S. Attorney. Obviously, if the default scheme
described in Scenarios A and B would not have presumptively barred
the first prosecutor from pursuing the uncharged offenses, neither
should it bar a different prosecutor from doing so. What happens,
however, when the first prosecutor would be barred, and the agreement does not expressly disclaim an attempt to bar other offices?
To be sure, a defendant might prefer to negotiate only with the
office that charged him, since another office might demand additional
concessions. But he should not be penalized for pursuing such a
strategy. Just as he cannot preclude interdistrict coordination, nor
should we expect him to foster such consultation, once he has ensured
that the relevant culpability information is on the table in his
negotiations with the first prosecutor. Indeed, the fragmentation of
prosecutorial authority and the flexibility of venue doctrine' 85 may
even prevent a defendant from knowing which other prosecutors
might take an interest in a charged transaction or series of
transactions.
Under these circumstances, a default rule
extinguishing the power of a second prosecutor to act where the first
186
could not, absent an express limitation of an agreement's scope, is

184. The approach taken here is thus at odds with the conclusorily reasoned result in
Latham and supplies a better rationale for the results in Carpenterand Nelson.
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1994 ed.) ('[A]ny offense against the United States begun in one
district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be... prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed."); United States
v. Ramirez-Amaya, 812 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1987) ('As to a charge of conspiracy, venue may
properly be laid in the district in which the conspiratorial agreement was formed or in any
district in which an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the coconspirators."); United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that no single
exclusive venue is required when the crime involves more than one location); United States v.
Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding venue proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3237 since acts
moved through different districts).
186. Questions would continue to arise as to the clarity of an express limitation. See, for
example, Ingram, 979 F.2d at 1185 (concluding that agreement in which Colorado U.S.
Attorney's Office promised "not to file any additional criminal charges in the District of Colorado
which are known to this office arising from [the defendants] criminal activities in the District of
Colorado... unambiguously bound only the District of Colorado").
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appropriate. 87 Such a rule might also have the salutary effect of
encouraging consultation and comity among offices within a sovereign
jurisdiction, or at least force each to develop boilerplate terms
88
specifying that its agreements bind no other office.
Developing an analysis for determining when one prosecuting
office's plea agreement should presumptively promise immunity
against another office's charges may not be enough, however, since a
finding of breach in this context may still leave an aggrieved defendant without a satisfactory remedy. Where, for example, domestic
law bars one district attorney from binding another, 189 a court might
not be able to halt the second's prosecution, and could offer a defendant only the rescission of his initial plea-a remedy of little use to
the defendant pleased with the outcome of his initial negotiations. 190
Unless a sovereign jurisdiction that so limits its prosecutor's author187. For an example of a case where the rule proposed here might have led to a different
result, see United States v. Quigley, 631 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1980). In Quigley, a defendant who
escaped from prison in Kansas, and was later caught with a gun in Texas, pled guilty to federal
escape charges in Kansas and then found himself facing a federal gun charge in Texas. At a
hearing, the Kansas prosecutor testified that he had not even known that the defendant was
armed when arrested in Texas. Id. at 416. Upholding the district court's finding that the
Kansas plea did not cover the Texas charges, the Fifth Circuit noted: "In the absence of inquiry
by defense counsel, or of knowledge by the prosecutor that an additional charge might be filed in
the other district, the latter was not obliged to clarify that the plea bargain concerned only the
escape charge pending in his own district and did not concern non-prosecution on charges
pending or to be filed in another district." Id. at 417.
Given that the seizure of a gun from the defendant at the time of his arrest was hardly
private information that the defendant was withholding for strategic reasons, the only question
left under the proposed scheme would be whether the gun possession was part of the
transaction charged in Kansas. If escape were considered a continuing crime that encompassed
the events at the time of the arrest, the Kansas prosecutor would be obliged to clarify the
limitations of the agreement.
188. See United States v. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. 208, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that plea
agreement had "customary language" to the effect that it bound only the signatory U.S.
Attorney's Office and did not bind "other federal, state or local prosecuting authorities"). The
use of such terms, however, creates the risk that defendants will overestimate the chances of
reprosecution and, therefore, undervalue sentencing concessions.
189. Compare Staten v. Neal, 880 F.2d 962, 964, 965-66 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding express
waiver of prosecution by state's attorney in one Illinois county does not bind state's attorney in
another county because first prosecutor lacked authority to do so under state law) with Harvey,
791 F.2d at 303 (finding immunity granted by plea agreement of one U.S. Attorney's Office
would bind the entire United States Government, including the U.S. Attorney in South
Carolina). See also Thomas v. I.N.S., 35 F.3d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that U.S.
Attorney's Office has implied authority to bind Immigration and Naturalization Service in plea
agreement); Margalli-Olvera,43 F.3d at 353 (same).
190. Such a defendant may have already served his sentence. For example, in State v.
Parker, 334 Md. 576, 640 A.2d 1104 (1994) the court held that it lacked the authority to order
recission of plea agreement provision governing how defendant would serve concurrent state
and federal sentences because [the defendant] has already provided information, testified and
served eleven years of his sentence".
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ity also grants defendants double jeopardy protection going well
yond Blockburger-or unless well-established doctrine barring
invocation of principles of estoppel or apparent authority against
government is overturned, 191 the potential for unfairness is real

incurable.

192

bethe
the
but

4. Scenario D: Different Sovereigns
Another scenario in which remedial limitations may loom
larger than questions of breach occurs when a defendant faces prosecution by two different sovereigns. Courts have long made clear that
neither a state nor the federal government can be bound by a plea
agreement in which its agents did not play a part. 193 Because some
defendants would settle for the rescission of their initial plea,194 however, we should still consider whether one sovereign's plea agreement
should be construed to promise immunity from prosecution in another
sovereign jurisdiction.

191. The rule that "[e]stoppel and apparent authority normally will not substitute for
actual authority to bind the United States government," is well established in federal law.
Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1339. See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (those
who deal with the Government bear the risk of the Government agent acting outside of his
authority); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 408-09 (1917) (stating that
the United States is not bound by the acts of its agents when they act outside of what the law
permits); Margalli-Olvera,43 F.3d at 353 (finding actual authority to bind the I.N.S.); Thomas,
35 F.3d at 1343-46 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (denying that Assistant U.S. Attorneys have
implicit authority to bind the Government); J. Dennis Hynes, Agency and Partnership: Cases,
Materialsand Problems 180 (Bobbs-Merril Co., Inc., 3d ed. 1989) ('The normal rules of apparent
authority, estoppel, and so forth do not apply to the actions of federal government employees").
192. In an ideal world of well-represented defendants, prosecutors' reputational considerations might compensate for the absence of a satisfactory scheme of legal remedies. See Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract,226 J. L. and Econ. 691, 703 (1983).
But such is not our world.
193. See United States v. Fuzer, 18 F.3d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1994) (state prosecutors cannot
bind federal prosecutors unless the latter have knowledge); United States v. Sackinger, 704 F.2d
29, 32 (2d Cir. 1983) (defendant could not bind the federal government by reaching an
agreement with the state government); United States v. Padilla, 589 F.2d 481, 484 (10th Cir.
1978) (United States is not bound by a state plea agreement); Parker, 640 A.2d at 1116-17
(noting the problems of binding federal prosecutors to a state prosecutor's promise or vice
versa). See also Heath, 474 U.S. at 87-94 (holding that a plea agreement limiting the sentence
to life imprisonment in one state does not preclude a second state from imposing the death
penalty for the same murder. The Court limited its analysis to the dual sovereignty doctrine,
without explicitly discussing the effect of the plea agreement).
194. See, for example, United States v. Birdwell, 887 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1989). In Birdwell,
the defendant entered a federal plea agreement that incorporated a letter from the state
prosecutor offering him an opportunity to plead to a single state count with a concurrent
sentence. The defendant claimed that the plea agreement had been breached when, after
execution of the agreement, the state brought two charges. Addressing the defendant's claim,
the court noted: "If... the state offer was a significant factor in inducing [defendant] to plead
guilty... his guilty plea is tainted." Id. at 645.
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My analysis here is tentative. Certainly the dual sovereignty
doctrine is far more easily grasped than the technicalities of 19a5
Blockburger analysis, and, especially after the Rodney King case,
even laypeople have a sense of its scope. It would thus seem that a
defendant should have no more right to expect that an agreement
with one sovereign will protect him against prosecution by another
than he does to expect that a plea involving one transaction will cover
charges arising out of an entirely different transaction.19 6 In both
situations, the operative default has always been "no protection," and
there is no reason to believe that even the most unsophisticated deMoreover, the
fendants have failed to appreciate that fact.
extraordinary, and perhaps antiquated, 197 notion of prosecutorial
independence that underlies the dual sovereignty doctrine counsels
against any default that would allow the unilateral actions of one
sovereign to overturn the plea agreement of another.
Even if we hold a defendant to knowledge of our federal system, however, he should still be allowed to presume that the prosecutor with whom he negotiates a plea agreement will not turn around
and help another sovereign seek further punishment. Consider the
defendant in Heath v. Alabama,198 who pled guilty in Georgia to avoid
the death penalty, only to find himself facing murder charges in
Alabama based on the same crime-with Georgia investigators all but
sitting with Alabama prosecutors at counsel's table. 199 The Supreme
Court relied on dual sovereignty principles in upholding Alabama's
power to proceed, yet gave no consideration to the part that Georgia
law enforcement officials played in Alabama's case. 00 The issue is not
the double jeopardy question of whether Alabama was controlled by

195. United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 116 S.
Ct. 2035, 135 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1996).
196. See Bouthot, 878 F.2d at 1512 (concluding that a state prosecutor has no duty to
inform the defendant as to the likelihood of future federal prosecution arising out of the same

transaction). See also Dennis E. Curtis, The Effect of Federalization on the Defense Function,
543 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 85, 95 (1996) ("The very existence of dual systems casts a
shadowy threat of federal prosecution in almost every [state] case, even though the number of
federal prosecutions is actually small compared with state prosecutions").
197. See Guerra, 73 N.C. L. Rev. at 1163 (cited in note 29).
198. 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
199. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[II]ad the Alabama trial judge not restricted the

State to one assisting officer at the prosecution's table during trial, a Georgia officer would have
shared the honors with an Alabama officer.").
200. The Court's failure to address this issue may well have been based on the limited
nature of the certiorari grant. Id. at 101 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the grant was
limited to the dual sovereignty issue).
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Georgia in this matter, 20' but the due process question of whether
Heath reasonably could have expected that his plea would end the
efforts of Georgia authorities to seek his execution.
Line drawing may be difficult here. Dual sovereignty would be
meaningless if Heath's plea prevented Alabama from obtaining evidence from Georgia officials. However, the active participation of
those officials in the Alabama proceedings effectively nullified the
sentencing concession on which Heath based his plea-and did so in a
context where he could not possibly be said to have made a strategic
choice.20 2 Had a clear default rule forced Georgia's prosecutors to
reserve explicitly the power to give this extraordinary assistance we
could be far more certain that the defendant was not duped.
E. Conclusion
Recognition of the potential for strategic behavior on both sides
during plea negotiations thus counsels a scheme of defaults that looks
more to each side's comparative advantage in acquiring information
and understanding its significance than to slippery issues of actual
knowledge and intent. This scheme gives content to vague notions of
good faith and reasonable expectations. It also has the practical advantages of allowing courts to resolve disputes about a plea agreement's coverage without a hearing, and reducing the costs of
negotiation by making defaults clear and predictable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps all I have done, in a backhanded way, is argue against
the minimalist double jeopardy doctrine adopted, or reaffirmed, by the
Court in Dixon-an argument based on the unfairness of a scheme
that frequently works to extract private information from defendants
as the price of repose. For nothing here supports the strong normative claim that Blockburger is the "right" approach to the Fifth
Amendment. And nothing here necessarily argues against the efforts
of some to use the Due Process Clause to expand the protection of all
201. See note 29.
202. In further proceedings, Heath alleged that his counsel made no effort to investigate
Alabama's intentions. Georgia authorities swore that "during the plea negotiations, they did
not make any representations about potential criminal penalties in Alabama." Heath v. Jones,
941 F.2d 1126, 1139 n.16 (11th Cir. 1991). For their part, Alabama authorities have avowed
that it had always been their intention to charge Heath at the conclusion of the Georgia case.
Heath v. State, 536 So.2d 142, 147 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
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defendants-regardless of whether they plead guilty or stand
successive
through
harassment
government
trial-against
prosecutions. 203 But any inquiry into the dynamics of the bargaining
that may or may not take place about a defendant's exposure to future
prosecutions must at least start by taking the current state of double
jeopardy doctrine as given. Certainly, this must be the stance of
courts endeavoring to impose due process rules of fair play on the
bargaining process, rules that offer expanded immunity against such
prosecutions only to defendants who enter guilty pleas. Any such
inquiry should appreciate that minimalist protection does have
certain socially beneficial effects on that process, at least with respect
to those defendants for whom double jeopardy doctrine makes much
difference. Barriers to negotiation may limit the extent of these
benefits, but courts should at least hesitate before ameliorating the
strategic dilemma faced by those who would profit from the
government's ignorance of their misdeeds.
The goal of this Article, however, is not simply to suggest a
new way of looking at "gaps" in the plea agreements of a somewhat
discrete class of criminal defendants-albeit a class to which
prosecutors and the caselaw have given much attention. It is also to
explore how recent applications of economic and game theory to
contract law can contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of
plea bargaining. A nuanced application of this literature does not
demand that we equate the relative bargaining power of a criminal
defendant vis-A-vis the prosecution with that of a party to an ordinary
commerical negotiation. Indeed, an inquiry into each side's strategic
calculus will frequently provide support for broader defendant
protections. But the strategic focus of contract theory helps remind
us that, in a criminal justice system in which plea bargaining is the
dominant mode of adjudication, the chief significance of a muchvaunted constitutional right may lie in its value as a bargaining chip,
and that the right's doctrinal dimensions are but one determinant of
each player's strategy.

203. See Amar and Marcus, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 34 (cited in note 8); King, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. at 132-34 (cited in note 8); Note, 109 Harv. L. Rev. at 1740 (cited in note 48).

